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Putting the “Corporate” Back into Corporate 
Personhood 
Caroline Kaeb* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court has been wrestling with the doctrinal premises of 
corporate personhood on several occasions in recent years. The Court follows a 
long history of jurisprudence that has been criticized as cryptic or nebulous at 
best by many scholars. Especially since the recent economic crisis, the doctrine 
of corporate personhood has had polarizing effects on the public debate about 
the role of corporations in society. At a policy level, the debate revolves around 
questions about the scope of regulatory reach of the state over business; at a so-
ciological level, the issue presents itself as an oxymoron, whether “corporations 
have human rights,” as the Wall Street Journal postulated. The article provides 
an important insight into what is wrong with the majority opinion in Citizens 
United. The paper argues that corporate legal theory (about the nature of the 
firm) should inform the debate on corporate constitutional rights in order to 
avoid intra-corporate conflicts with competing interests of shareholders and—
depending on the prevailing corporate theory in a national context—its other 
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The United States has been the perceived thought leader on corporate 
personhood when compared to major foreign legal systems. As early as 
1886, the U.S. Supreme Court coined the legal concept of corporate per-
sonhood in its Santa Clara decision: “The Court does not wish to hear ar-
gument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to those corpora-
tions. We are all of the opinion that it does.”1 The Supreme Court’s ruling 
marked the beginning of a line of jurisprudence that has increasingly wa-
tered down the distinction between corporations and human beings. Thus, 
the Court has endowed corporations with rights that go well beyond the 
original corporate privilege of limited liability and even beyond mere com-
mercial rights.  
The Court has extended to corporations constitutional rights that pri-
marily avail to natural persons, evoking criticism of judicial activism and a 
pro-business bias.2 More recently, the Court reinforced its position on cor-
porate personhood in its infamous decision in Citizens United holding that 
the (corporate) nature of the rights holder is entirely irrelevant when deter-
mining the scope of corporate rights under the U.S. Constitution.3 
It has even been argued that the United States is the only country in the 
world providing for corporate personhood in a constitutional context.4 But 
while the United States has become well-known for its long-standing tradi-
tion and leading role with regard to promoting corporate personhood, the 
notion of corporate personhood is not a uniquely American one.  
The notion that the United States has an exclusive hold on corporate 
personhood is a common misperception, particularly with regard to Europe. 
Granted, unlike in the United States, the manifestations of corporate per-
 
 1  Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (Waite, C.J.) (emphasis added). 
 2  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, The Broad Reach of the Narrow Hobby Lobby Ruling, L.A. 
TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-hobby-lobby-supreme 
-court-20140701-story.html; Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-
defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted_all&_r_0; Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Consti-
tutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2014). 
 3  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (referring to “the premise 
that the First 
Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity); id. at 
364 (holding that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinc-
tions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech); see also id. 
at 376.  
 4  Rob Kall, Is the USA the Only Nation in the World with Corporate Personhood?, ECONOMY IN 
CRISIS (Apr. 10, 2012), http://economyincrisis.org/content/is-the-usa-the-only-nation-in-the-world-with-
corporate-personhood (quoting Mila Versteeg) (last visited March 15, 2014) 
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sonhood have traditionally been more tentative in European legal systems, 
especially in civil law jurisdictions. This is illustrated vividly by the tradi-
tional resistance of European civil law systems to hold corporations crimi-
nally liable (as legal persons) under their domestic criminal codes.5 It may 
seem like a natural progression that European legal systems, which have 
been holding firm on the doctrine of societas delinquere non potest,6 also 
would have conceptual troubles acknowledging corporations, as fictional 
entities, to be holders of constitutional, fundamental, or even human rights. 
In fact, even though many EU member states have been reluctant to confer 
entity liabilities and rights on corporations beyond the context of civil and 
commercial matters,7 their domestic courts generally have not barred corpo-
rations, as legal persons, from procedural safeguards and substantive rights 
per se.8 Particularly the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Eu-
rope’s regional human rights court, has had a long history of extending the 
fundamental rights guarantees under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the Convention)9 to corporations and has been the engine for a pro-
business agenda of fundamental rights protections in Europe.10  
Considering that both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECHR have ex-
ercised a proactive approach to corporate rights, a comparative analysis of 
commonalities and differences in methodology can shed light on how much 
“corporate” there still is in corporate personhood on each side of the Atlan-
tic and what lessons the two systems can learn from one another. It is im-
perative that the distinction between corporations and human beings be re-
stored and reinforced through the law. It is simply not sufficient, with 
reference to “corporate personhood,” merely to equate corporations with 
human beings without accounting for the special characteristics of the cor-
porate form, in terms of fiduciary duties, and the possible intra-corporate 
tensions resulting from the separation of ownership and control. This article 
argues that instead it is crucial to account for the characteristics and com-
 
 5  Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about Ameri-
can Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 105 (2004). 
 6  “A legal entity cannot beblameworthy.” 
 7  Thus, whereas corporations have standing to sue and be sued in civil matters in nearly every juris-
diction, civil law systems (especially in Europe) have been traditionally been reluctant to provide for 
corporate entity liability in the context of criminal proceedings. 
 8  However, constitutional rights protections under their respective domestic Constitutions have been 
applied to corporations in a manner that is far more restrictive than in the United States. See Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 102 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.). 
 9  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Pro-
tocols No. 11 and 14, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950 C.E.T.S. No. 194 (entered into force June 1, 
2010) [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention entered into force on September 3, 1953; to date 47 
European states are party to the Convention. The Convention provides the treaty basis for the European 
human rights regime that has aims to ensure compliance with basic human rights principles throughout 
Europe. See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 891–92 (2013). 
 10  MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES 134–35 (2006). 
3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT  DELETE) 11/16/15  12:18 PM 
Putting the “Corporate” Back 
35:591 (2015) 
595 
plexities of corporate structures when determining if respective rights pro-
tections are applicable to corporations.11 Only then can conflicts with share-
holder interests—as the primary constituency of the corporation—be miti-
gated and unintended consequences pertaining to corporate personhood be 
avoided. 
Corporations are considered entities in their own right,12 yet they can 
only act through their agents, while owing a fiduciary duty to the compa-
ny’s shareholders.13 Thus, it is erroneous to think of a corporation in a one-
dimensional way, either in terms of an association of individuals or as a 
person in its own right. Instead, corporations should be perceived as having 
features of both associations and individuals, at least for the exercise of de-
termining the scope of fundamental rights granted to the corporate entity. 
Conferring rights on corporate entities acknowledges them as “independent 
entit[ies] with interests, ends, and knowledge of its own.”14 Even if one 
does not go as far as viewing the corporations as an “enforcement agent” of 
their human constituents’ rights/interests,15 it still cannot be ignored that 
corporations constitute a complex structure of a multitude of diverse inter-
ests that can conflict with one another and that need to be balanced. 
This analysis can extend well beyond avoiding conflict between the 
rights conferred on the corporate entity and the interests of its shareholders 
to include interests of a company’s key stakeholders16 as well. Certainly, 
this would require a stakeholder-centric corporate objective and governance 
 
 11  See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
95, 108 (1995) (arguing that the respective theory of the nature of the corporation has “implications for 
the nature and extent of corporate constitutional rights.”); Daniel Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why 
Corporate Speech is not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1024 (suggesting that “[i]f corporate speech is to be 
corporate at all, there must be a clear explanation of how the group decision legitimately can be made.”) 
 12  See generally Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994). 
 13  See Daniel Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, 
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1996). 
 14  David Ciepley, Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corpora-
tions, 1 J.L. & CTS. 221, 223 (2013). 
 15  Burt Neuborne, Of “Singles” Without Baseball: Corporations as Frozen Relational Moments, 64 
RUTGERS L. REV. 769, 775 (2012). 
 16  There is some variety in how authors have defined the term “stakeholder.” As Donaldson & Pres-
ton note regarding a leading example: 
The much-quoted Stanford Research Institute’s (SRI) definition of stakeholders as “those 
groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” clearly implies that 
corporate managers must induce constructive contributions from their stakeholders to ac-
complish their own desired results (e.g., perpetuation of the organization, profitability, stabil-
ity, growth). 
Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 72 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
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model under the law of the respective domestic jurisdiction, which has tra-
ditionally not been the case in the United States17 but increasingly has taken 
hold in European legal systems, such as the UK, France, and Germany.18 
Yet, while it is crucial to account for potential corporate entity-constituent 
conflicts, there is no one-size-fits-all approach about how to deal with such 
conflicts—these are inherent in the corporate form and its very nature. Ra-
ther, it depends on the prerogatives of the respective legal system how the 
entity’s and constituents’ interests ought to be balanced. While in the Unit-
ed States statutory and common law protections might be effective to ad-
dress these conflicts,19 different solutions at the constitutional level might 
be necessary in other jurisdictions, depending on their respective legal cul-
ture and the statutory protections available for corporate constituents, name-
ly, shareholders and other stakeholders.20  
A transatlantic comparative legal analysis vividly illustrates the role of 
corporate legal theory (about the nature of the firm) in the corporate rights 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the lack thereof in the case 
law of Europe’s “Supreme Court” and its regional human rights court. The 
European courts have featured a strictly teleological approach, thus avoid-
ing issues of nature of the corporation, ignoring the diversity of shareholder 
(and stakeholder) interests and glossing over potential intra-corporate con-
flicts. U.S. doctrine, on the other hand, is much more nuanced, both histori-
cally and in a contemporary setting. Thus, the Supreme Court has employed 
a protection rationale that acknowledges shareholder interests as being dis-
tinct and possibly in conflict with the rights of the corporate entity itself, 
while the jurisprudence in Europe does not account for this potential clash 
of interests. In its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court further ex-
tended its protection rationale to other stakeholders holding that “the pur-
 
 17  See Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (installing the theory of shareholder 
wealth maximization as a basic feature of corporate law); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits 
in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005) (giving an account of the case law and statu-
tory law in the United States providing for managerial discretion to take into account the interests of 
constituencies other than shareholders, for example, under constituency statutes and antitakeover laws). 
In contrast, the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hobby Lobby includes lan-
guage that points towards a stakeholder-sensitive corporate purpose. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).  
 18  See MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 126 
(2009). 
 19  The majority opinion in Citizens United dismisses Austin’s shareholder protection rationale by 
holding that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the 
procedures of corporate democracy,’” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 
(2010) (citation omitted), by which, “presumably the Court means the rights of shareholders to vote and 
to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty,” id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 20  See, e.g. Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, Corporate Law and Governance, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 830 (2007); Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance 
Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117 (2007); see generally THE DERIVATIVE 
ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE & FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (D. W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012). 
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pose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people as-
sociated with the corporation, including shareholders, officers, and employ-
ees.”21 
Having been faced with the issue whether “a for-profit corporation [is 
allowed] to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives . . . , 
based on the religious objections of the corporation’s owners,”22 the Su-
preme Court in Hobby Lobby has again taken on the fundamental question 
of the corporate theory underpinnings of the corporate personhood doctrine. 
Does a company, as a proxy of its shareholders’ interests, have beliefs and 
intrinsic values after all? Or ought the religious beliefs and interests of 
shareholders be viewed as distinguishable from the corporate entity itself? 
Is the purpose of the corporate fiction to protect human beings, namely the 
shareholders and other stakeholders (such as employees) associated with the 
corporation?23 These and related questions inform the American legal anal-
ysis while the European Courts in their corporate rights jurisprudence are 
entirely silent on these fundamental questions that go to the very nature of 
the corporation.  
Taking a look to Europe, this article examines what happens when the 
essence of corporate personhood is ignored. Many would agree that more 
rights (and more speech) are better,24 but it is also commonly understood 
that rights can clash with the rights of others, i.e., to grant rights to one per-
son naturally cuts back on the rights of others. The same is true in a corpo-
rate context providing one recognizes the corporation from the perspective 
of its constituents. The danger of not recognizing this is well illustrated in 
Europe. 
A sharp contrast emerges between Europe and the United States on the 
essential elements requires in examining corporate personhood. The ECHR 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (together, European Courts) have 
outright ignored corporate theory and related questions of the nature of the 
firm from the start. Both European Courts have granted the same guarantees 
to corporations as to individual persons without accounting for legal princi-
ples about the nature of the corporation in general.25 In contrast, the Su-
 
 21  While the majority opinion recognizes the need to protect interests of other stakeholders, in the 
end, the Court’s decision was guided merely by the interests of the controlling shareholder of the closed 
corporation in question. In dissent, J. Ginsburg criticizes the majority opinion for “accommodation of a 
for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third 
parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women em-
ployed by Hobby Lobby.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 22  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 23  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).  
 24  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (citing Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
 25  See generally Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); Société Colas Est 
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preme Court, while not always finding the corporate nature of the rights 
holder decisive,26 does not turn a blind eye to the to the nature, organiza-
tional structures, and intra-institutional dynamics of the corporation.27 In the 
United States, corporate theory is an important factor in the corporate per-
sonhood debate, as seen both within legal doctrine and in dissents and con-
currences challenging majoritarian teleological approach. This has had the 
effect of deepening the analysis of corporate personhood in the United 
States, something that is lacking in Europe as result of their atheoretical ap-
proach.28  
Granted, the Supreme Court’s approach to corporate constitutional 
rights can be perceived as not always coherent and even bifurcated with re-
gard to the methodology applied.29 Whereas the Supreme Court explicitly 
decided some cases based on corporate theory,30 it found in its decision in 
Citizens United that the corporate nature of the rights applicant is irrele-
vant.31 However, the Supreme Court exhibits an awareness of potential in-
tra-corporate conflicts throughout its case law that is part of a robust de-
bate,32 which is absent in the jurisprudence of its European counterparts. 
The United States has often been looked to as a model for constitutional de-
sign. Even though some scholars have argued that America’s leading role is 
diminishing in that regard,33 the Supreme Court’s methodology on corpo-
rate constitutional rights, far more advanced than the European approach, 
can be seen as a north star for Europe. 
There is a great need to recalibrate how we understand corporations 
and what rights are vested in them. This holds true especially in Europe, 
where recent developments have amplified the need for the high-level Eu-
ropean Courts to reach clarity on the exactly those questions. With the Lis-
bon Treaty of 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became primary EU 
law and thus provides constitutional-like protections to all EU citizens from 
EU acts and legislation.34 Much of the case law of the ECHR is now ex-
pected to be imported into the judicial decision-making process of the ECJ, 
 
and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002). 
 26  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
(1978). 
 27  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788; see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (2010); see Hobby Lobby 
Stores, 134 S.Ct. at 2768 (2014).  
 28  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146. 
 29  See Carl Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 
HASTINGS L. J., 577, 622, 629 (1990). 
 30  Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76 (1906) ; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 
(1950).  
 31  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350, 376 (2010). 
 32  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805–08 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 475–79 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 33  Kall, supra note 4 (quoting Milla Versteeg). 
 34  JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 146–59 (2010).  
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as the highest EU court.35 In the wake of these developments towards an 
EU-centric regime of fundamental rights, many questions about the scope 
of those rights have gained increased importance, especially with regard to 
the beneficiaries of such protections. In 2009, Intel surprised the legal 
community in Europe by invoking the due process protections under the 
Convention as a defense to the EU’s anti-trust proceedings against the soft-
ware giant.36 The Wall Street Journal shortly thereafter postulated the fol-
lowing oxymoron: “Do corporations have human rights?”37  
Europe is finding itself at a crossroads with regard to corporate per-
sonhood and how it manifests itself. The situation at the European level gets 
further complicated by the reality that, since the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ and 
the ECHR have overlapping jurisdiction over fundamental rights protection 
in Europe.38 Since the concurrent relationship between both courts is not 
formally defined, it remains unclear what would happen in case of diver-
gent case law between the two courts.39 In light of these new realities in Eu-
rope, the need for a coherent and workable methodology with regard to cor-
porate fundamental rights under the treaty regime is indispensable, 
especially since signs of a divergence between the ECJ and the ECHR on 
the subject have already become apparent.40 This article demonstrates why 
European Courts should draw upon some of the thinking and analysis that 
has arisen in the United States on corporate rights in a constitutional con-
text. However, while the Supreme Court provides a workable methodology 
that is much more nuanced than the one employed by its European counter-
parts, the justices do not always appear entirely coherent in drawing a clear 
distinction between corporations and human beings. 
This article explains how a detailed comparative analysis of the juris-
 
 35  See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Court of Human Rights after Lisbon, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AFTER 
LISBON 153, 161 (Sybe de Vries et al eds., 2013).  
 36  See Editorial, Intel’s Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/17/opinion/17mon2.html. 
 37  Alan Riley, Do Companies Have Human Rights?: EU antitrust law may violate due process 
rules, WSJ.COM (July 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203609 
204574314333538014034 (last visited March 15, 2014). 
 38  See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court 
of Human Rights after Lisbon, 153, 161, 165, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU 
AFTER LISBON (Sybe de Vries et al eds., 2013); Butti, The Roles and Relationship between the Two 
European Courts in Post-Lisbon EU Human Rights Protection, JURIST: Dateline (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:30 
PM), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/09/elena-butti-lisbon-treaty.php. 
 39  See Laurent Scheek, The Relationship Between the European Courts and Integration Through 
Human Rights, 65 HEIDELBERG J. INTL. L. 837, 854 (2005) 
 40  See generally Jaanika Erne, Discourse Upon the Constituent Human Rights Developments in the 
European Union, 12 JURIDICA INTL. 80 (2007); Lorena Rincon-Eizaga, Human Rights in the European 
Union: Conflict Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts Regarding Interpretation of Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 11 REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. BOGOTA 119 (2008) 
(Colom.). 
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prudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Courts can inform 
both a European way forward that is reflective of the complexities of the 
corporate form, and can also fill in the blanks in the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence on corporate personhood. Section I examines the history of corpo-
rate personhood in Europe and the United States and illustrates that the doc-
trine needs to be understood as a product of the legal context of its time. 
Section II takes a comparative look at the contemporary corporate person-
hood doctrine in Europe and the United States and defies the conventional 
wisdom in legal scholarship of a shared trans-Atlantic pragmatism that ig-
nores the “corporate” in corporate personhood. Section III then illustrates 
the importance of corporate theory (about the nature of the firm) to avoid 
intra-corporate conflicts with competing shareholder and stakeholder inter-
ests within the corporate personhood doctrine. Conducting an in-depth 
comparative legal analysis, this section demonstrates the role of corporate 
theory (and a protection rationale) in the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and the lack thereof in the jurisprudence of the European Courts. Sec-
tion IV concludes with the normative implications of a corporate theory-
informed approach, in Europe in terms of a doctrinal shift and enhanced in-
stitutional cooperation between the high-level European courts and the 
member states, and in the United States in terms of a refocused doctrinal 
methodology. 
 I. THE TRANSATLANTIC HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
PERSONHOOD 
Understanding corporate personhood as a product of its time, rather 
than as an abstract legal construct that emerged in a legal vacuum, is crucial 
when conducting a comparative analysis of different legal systems. This 
section will show that the historical context can help explain the prevailing 
differences between legal systems and provide guidance on what aspects of 
one legal system’s methodology might successfully translate into the prac-
tice of another jurisdiction. 
Unlike in the United States, the manifestations of corporate person-
hood have traditionally been more tentative in European legal systems, es-
pecially in civil law jurisdictions. While European states have been reluc-
tant to confer entity liabilities and rights on corporations beyond the context 
of civil and commercial matters, the United States has long made the leap to 
endow corporations with personhood in a way that imposes far-reaching li-
abilities as well as rights.41 In this section, we first examine early American 
jurisprudence about the structure of the corporations. The second subsection 
then demonstrates the implications of the democratization of incorporation 
for the American legal doctrine on corporate personality. Finally, the Amer-
 
 41  See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 221. 
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ican legal history of corporate personhood is contrasted with the European 
experience that has traditionally been coined by tentativeness towards the 
notion of corporate personality and has recently resulted in institutional ten-
sions between the high-level European Courts and the member states.  
 A. The “Artificial Entity” as a Structural Limitation on Government  
The early corporate personhood jurisprudence by the Supreme Court 
was guided mainly by an effort to bring corporations under the tenets of 
federal courts and federal common law and remove corporations from the 
prerogatives of the states.42 This “federalist” agenda in sensu lato has domi-
nated much of the 19th century jurisprudence on the issue by the Court. As 
early as 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged corporations as “be-
ings” in their own right, even if “artificial” ones. In its famous Dartmouth 
College decision, the Court applied the Contract Clause to corporations, 
thereby confirming their right to contract and freedom from impairment by 
the state in their contractual relationships.43 In Dartmouth College, the 
Court held that the corporate charter granted by the government (here the 
Crown) was a contract under the U.S. Constitution. This landmark case was 
the first important milestone in American legal history to emancipate the 
corporate form and ensure its very existence based on its charter, without 
any state being able to alter the terms of a corporate charter unilaterally af-
ter it was granted.44  
Another line of early case law dealt with the legal nature of the corpo-
ration, in a different context, though. Thus, the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the question of whether a corporation was a “citizen” for Article III 
diversity jurisdiction purposes in its 1809 decision in Bank of the United 
States v. Deveaux.45 At the time, the Court was not ready to embrace the 
idea of corporate citizenship as a freestanding legal concept. It therefore 
held in Deveaux that a corporation derives its citizenship from the citizen-
ship of its shareholders, rather than from its state of incorporation or princi-
pal place of business.46 This made it difficult for corporations to satisfy the 
requirement of complete diversity that would open up federal courts as a lit-
igation forum for corporations.47 
The question of corporate citizenship under the meaning of Article III 
jurisdiction was of significant strategic importance since it was the lynchpin 
 
 42  See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 782. 
 43  Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 576 (1819) (interpreting the Contract Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). 
 44  Id. at 573.  
 45  Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 67 (1809). 
 46  Id. at 61, 91–92 (holding that, for jurisdictional purposes, the courts should “look to the character 
of the individuals who compose the corporation.”) 
 47  See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 782–83. 
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upon which access to federal courts, as a neutral federal judicial forum, was 
grounded in federal common law.48 Eventually, the Court made the leap in 
its 1844 decision in Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Railroad v. Letson 
that a corporation was a citizen of its state of incorporation for purposes of 
Article III jurisdiction.49 These early efforts to capture the personification of 
the corporation were still rather tentative and did not grant full-fledged per-
sonhood, or even citizenship, to corporations under the 14th Amendment of 
the Constitution.  
The underlying premise of the Supreme Court’s dealing with questions 
about the nature of the corporation during this era, was not to construe cor-
porations as persons or citizens under the Constitution in general but merely 
in the context of constitutional provisions that would limit the states’ pow-
er, both judicially and otherwise, over the corporate form.50 Corporate per-
sonhood during the era of Chief Justice Marshall therefore needs to be un-
derstood in terms of a structural limitation on the government, rather than a 
conferral of rights on the corporation.51 In that vein, the Court perceived 
corporations as “mere creatures of law” and as such subject to government 
regulation.52 This understanding by the Supreme Court traces back to the 
special chartering power that was vested in the state at the time. According-
ly, incorporation was a privilege that was granted by the state legislature 
upon application for a corporate charter.53 
 B. The Corporate Personification as a Function of the 
Democratization of Incorporation 
A major shift has occurred during the second half of the 19th century, 
when the process of incorporation became “democratized” and special char-
tering was replaced by general incorporation.54 This development has had 
important implications for the increasing personification of the corporation 
under the law. At the time, the modern business corporation became in-
creasingly available to a broad public as an “investment vehicle with per-
 
 48  See id. at 782. 
 49  Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 557–59 (1844).  
 50  See Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. 
L. REV. 173, 184–85 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641–42 (1988); Mayer, supra note 29, at 580–81. 
 51  See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 208 (1990) (discussing the 
“regulatory notion of corporate law” during the 19th century); Ribstein, supra note 9, at 97–99; Thomas 
Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (& Market) Failure, & Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
273, 280–81 (1991). 
 52  Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 53  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 390–91 (3d ed. 2005); see also 
Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98.  
 54  See Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 1634–35 (discussing how the incorporation process became 
“democratized” at that time). 
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petual life, limited liability, and entity-shielding.”55 In more and more 
states, incorporation was no longer a legislative matter, but rather the corpo-
rate form could be created through a simple administrative procedure by 
anyone who was interested in conducting business.56 Consequently, incor-
poration became a right of many, rather than a privilege of the few. The rise 
of general incorporation profoundly changed the legal conception of the 
corporation57 as it undermined the premise of Dartmouth holding that the 
corporation is an “artificial being” and “a mere creation of the law.”58 The 
changes of the social and economic conditions in the late 19th century sig-
nificantly paved the way for the emergence of a new theory in corporate 
law59 that views the corporation as “a natural product of private initiative,”60 
rather than an “artificial creation of state law.” This led to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Santa Clara in 1886 where the Court held that a corpo-
ration is a “person” for the purpose of the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment.61 The Court’s Santa Clara decision is considered as the 
watershed moment in American legal history for the personification of the 
corporation in its own right and can be considered the beginning of corpo-
rate personhood as we understand it today, namely in terms of the applica-
tion of the Bill of Rights to corporations.62  
Santa Clara provided the basis for constitutional challenges by corpo-
rations against the increasing state regulation of the Progressive Era. But it 
was particularly the Supreme Court’s approach in Lochner63 that effectively 
complemented the corporation’s 14th Amendment rights against state regu-
lation by reading substantive due process protections into it.64 “For the next 
fifty years, under the banner of substantive due process, and in the guise of 
‘persons,’ corporations challenged Progressive era regulation . . . .”65 Dur-
ing both the Lochner era and the subsequent New Deal era, corporations did 
not focus on making claims of corporate personality in an effort to assert 
the Bill of Rights. Rather, there were other constitutional battles to be 
fought until 1937, and at the center were the debate over economic due pro-
cess rights and, during the New Deal, challenges against overbroad federal 
 
 55  See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 778. 
 56  See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Meth-
od of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 75 (2005); FRIEDMAN, supra note 53 , at 
390–91. 
 57  See Krannich, supra note 56, at 75–76; Liam Seamus O’Mellin, Neither Contract nor Conces-
sion: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 290–30 (2006). 
 58  Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 59  See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50, at 184–85. 
 60  Millon, supra note 51, at 201. 
 61  Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886). 
 62  See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50.  
 63  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 64  See Mayer, supra note , at 588.  
 65  Id. at 588–89. 
3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/15  12:18 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:591 (2015) 
604 
regulatory powers. It is fair to say that “constitutional limitations on federal 
regulatory power supplanted debates over corporate personhood.”66 Over 
the course of the 20th century, the Court granted extensive rights to corpo-
rations that went well beyond the scope of commercial rights, in terms of 
the right to property67 and the right to enter into contracts.68 
The modern corporate form is very much a product of its history. The 
analysis of the underlying dynamics that were instrumental in shaping the 
emerging legal doctrine of corporate personality therefore informs a nu-
anced understanding of the corporate entity as a product of different socio-
economic conditions throughout history. While the “concession theory” has 
lost much of its significance with the democratization of incorporation pro-
cedures,69 this stage in the history of corporations has left its traces that are 
still prominent in contemporary corporate law.70 Thus, the corporate form is 
not simply a “glorified partnership.”71 Rather, even today, many of its core 
features, such as limited liability, entity shielding, and indefinite life are 
created by the law and cannot be instituted simply through contracts.72 At 
the same time, the shift to general incorporation has amplified the im-
portance of the individual shareholders that can organize themselves in the 
corporate form as an investment vehicle.73 Both strains in American corpo-
rate legal history have had a significant impact on how the law views corpo-
rations today. It is this multi-layered conception of the corporate entity that 
has grown over time in American society and under the law and has influ-
enced the long-standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the issue. 
 C. Europe’s Tentativeness and the Troubled Relationship Between 
its Courts 
In contrast, the corporate rights jurisprudence of the high-level Euro-
pean Courts lacks any discussion about the nature of the corporation. There 
might be many plausible and even congruent reasons that could account for 
this neglect of corporate theory in Europe’s case law on corporate funda-
mental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. One im-
portant factor certainly is the very different historical development of the 
legal concept of corporate personality in Europe compared to the United 
 
 66  Id. at 598.  
 67  Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896). 
 68  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. 
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 69  See Millon, supra note 51, at 212. David Ciepley on the other hand makes a case for returning 
“to the original theory of the corporation, which in its main points was undisputed for centuries, but 
which has been out of favor since the end of the 19th century.” Ciepley, supra note 14, at 224.  
 70  See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 97.  
 71  Ciepley supra note 14, at 226.  
 72  See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98. 
 73  See Millon, supra note 51, at 211; see also Krannich, supra note 56, at 72.  
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States. In the legal systems of most EU member states and in the European 
human rights system, the notion of the corporate entity as a person with its 
very own rights and liabilities has not prospered as it has in the U.S. legal 
system.74 Thus, it was only in the mid-1990s that the major European civil 
law jurisdictions incorporated provisions for corporate entity liability into 
their domestic criminal codes.75 Many European countries introduced cor-
porate criminal liability provisions in the wake of implementing legislation 
for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, fulfilling their re-
sponsibilities as parties to that treaty, even though the Rome Statute does 
not require them to do so.76 However, even today and despite this overall 
regulatory trend in Europe, there are still important outliers. For example, 
Germany remains a “bastion” of the traditional principle societas delin-
quere non potest, with the result that under the German legal system a cor-
poration as a legal person cannot be held criminally liable.77 
While group rights are a well-established concept in many civil law ju-
risdictions in Europe,78 national courts have been more tentative than the 
U.S. Supreme Court to grant constitutional rights to business corporations.79 
Many European courts have taken issue particularly with constitutional 
rights cases where the profit-driven and purely commercial nature of busi-
ness corporations leads (de facto) to constitutional protection of mere eco-
nomic activity.80 For example, the German Supreme Court held that com-
 
 74  The Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1909 that federal criminal statutes applying to “per-
sons” also extend to corporations. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 
(1909). 
 75  See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1481, 1493–94 (2009); see also Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC 
Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 333, 340–42 (2009).  
 76  See Supplemental Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 14–20, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 
2165350 (providing a list of nations that have ratified the Rome Statute and where corporations are po-
tentially exposed to criminal liability for atrocity crimes and pointing out that many of these nations in-
troduced corporate criminal liability through the Rome Statute implementation process). 
 77  See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely 
American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 142 (2008). 
 78  See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 
19(3), May 23, 1949, BGBl. (Ger.) (“The basic rights shall also apply to domestic artificial persons to 
the extent that the nature of such rights permits.”). 
 79  See Diskant, supra note 77, 129. 
 80  This tension is clearly visible where transnational courts, such as the European Court of Human 
Rights, go against the rulings of domestic courts on interpretation of the Convention. See, e.g. Societe 
Colas Est v. F UKr., 37971/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002, ¶¶ 41–42 (disagreeing with the French court and 
holding that the right against violations of privacy extended not only to natural persons, but also to ap-
pellant corporations); Observer and Guardian v. U.K., 13585/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1991 ¶¶ 72–74 (holding 
that Article 14, prescribing equal treatment of speech of persons by national origin, extended to news 
corporations of different national origins); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16, 
¶¶ 47–48 (1990) (disagreeing with a Swiss court’s holding that freedom of expression extended only to 
natural, not corporate, persons). 
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mercial speech is only protected under the German Basic Law (German 
Constitution) if the statement in question has a minimum political content, 
not however if it is merely pursuing the economics interests of the speak-
er.81 
Despite this reluctance at the national level, the ECHR and the ECJ 
have broadly applied the human rights protections under the Convention to 
corporations without addressing the corporate nature of the rights applicant. 
Both courts have been equating corporations with persons within the mean-
ing of the Convention with no or little corporate law analysis.82 This is even 
more startling considering that the ECHR has persistently encountered re-
sistance by member states such as Germany, France, and Switzerland, 
which have argued in many instances that the corporate nature of the appli-
cant and the commercial elements of the activity are relevant and do not fit 
the underlying rationale of free expression and privacy under the Conven-
tion.83  
In order to appease national voices of judicial activism,84 high-level 
European Courts would be well advised to follow the lead of the Supreme 
Court and look to corporate theory to inform their analysis about the ap-
plicability of fundamental rights provisions to business corporations. The 
need to inject corporate theory about the nature of the firm into the constitu-
tional analysis in Europe is an imminent one considering that the “person-
al”85 character of rights provisions is particularly prominent now in the hu-
man rights regime. After all, human rights are intrinsically linked to the 
human dignity and liberty of human beings and do not extend easily to legal 
persons, such as corporations.86  
It is crucial therefore that the “corporate” be put back into corporate 
personhood, especially in the context of a human rights regime. From an in-
stitutional cooperation perspective,87 consulting corporate theory to deter-
 
 81  Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 102 
BVerfGE 347 (2000), 102 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.) (holding that com-
mercial speech is only protected under the German Basic Law [German Constitution] if the statement in 
question has a minimum political content). 
 82  See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002); Hoechst AG v. 
Commission Case 46/87 & 227/88 ECJ (1989) (noting that the principle laid down in Article 8 may be 
regarded as applying not only to natural persons but also to legal persons). 
 83  See Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25 
(1989); Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97, ¶ 27 (1993); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 
178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16, ¶ 44(2) (1990). 
 84  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 147.  
 85  As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out in its decision in FCC v. AT &T, Inc., the fact that 
corporations are considered “persons” under the law, does not mean that they can hold “personal” rights. 
The Courts states that “ ‘personal’ is often used to mean precisely the opposite of [something that is] 
business-related.” 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1178 (2011). 
 86  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 116–17. 
 87  See Alec Stone Sweet & Hellen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, in 
A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 3–30 (Hellen Keller 
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mine the scope of corporate fundamental rights would provide an oppor-
tunity for the ECHR and the ECJ to bring their jurisprudence in line with 
the approach by national judiciaries in the member states. By addressing the 
question of the nature of the corporation in the context of corporate entity 
rights, the (competing) interests of a company’s constituents—primarily its 
shareholders and potentially also its stakeholders—will inform the analysis 
and possibly the outcome. Thus, a “human face” would be put on the legal 
abstraction of the corporate entity and thereby emphasize the group-feature 
of corporations. 
 II. THE LOST “CORPORATE” PERSON: A SHARED 
TRANSATLANTIC JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM? 
At first sight, it seems that both American and European Courts share 
an important common feature in their corporate personhood jurisprudence, 
namely a judicial pragmatism that is informed by a teleological approach 
rather than considerations of corporate theory. A closer analysis of the case 
law, however, reveals that there is a significant divergence in legal ap-
proach on both sides of the Atlantic. Respectively, in U.S. courts, the “cor-
porate” nature of the rights applicants is still an integral part of the ongoing 
legal debate and thereby has significantly shaped the evolution of the doc-
trine of corporate personhood over time. 
Looking at the scope of corporate fundamental rights protections, it is 
common to the American and European legal tradition that commercial 
rights like the right to property and the right to enter into contracts have al-
ways been considered applicable to corporations,88 while “human nature” 
rights such as the right against self-incrimination and the right to life have 
been considered “purely personal” or intrinsic to natural persons.89 Never-
theless, one can discover traction with regard to some rights in a cross-
jurisdictional comparison.  
For example, the rights to privacy and freedom of expression have 
been subject to much controversy on both sides of the Atlantic about 
whether and to what extent such rights apply to corporate actors.90 
Comparing the American and European juridical approaches to corpo-
rate speech and corporate privacy is particularly suited to illustrate the 
commonalities as well as differences between both systems and the norma-
 
& Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008); see also Steven Greer, What’s Wrong with the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 680, 682 (2008). 
 88  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 110. 
 89  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (holding that “certain ‘pure-
ly personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to 
corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been 
limited to the protection of individuals.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 90  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 147. 
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tive implications that follow. While the example of corporate speech shows 
a glaring similarity in judicial interpretative approach, it provides only one 
dimension to the trans-Atlantic comparison on the issue.  
A closer look at the European and U.S. jurisprudence on corporate en-
tity rights uncovers a doctrinal difference with important normative impli-
cations, namely the role of corporate theory or, in the case of the Europe, 
the lack thereof in the analysis of the courts. Corporate theory (dealing with 
the nature of the corporation and potential intra-corporate conflicts) informs 
the discussion of the Supreme Court in its corporate speech jurisprudence 
(and keeps appearing in the form of dissenting and concurring opinions), 
even if corporate theory was eventually not considered decisive in First 
Amendment cases for the reasons set forth below.91 The American case law 
dealing with corporate privacy further amplifies the role of corporate theory 
when determining the applicability of constitutional and fundamental rights 
provisions to corporations.92 
This section examines the Transatlantic divide on corporate person-
hood first by understanding the methodologies employed by American and 
European legal systems. Then the divide between the two bodies of law is 
analyzed with an eye to the role of corporate theory about the nature of the 
firm. 
 A. The Apparent Transatlantic Conventional Wisdom: From 
Ontology to Teleology 
While traditionally in the United States corporate personality has been 
a vehicle to ensure access of corporations to federal courts under diversity 
jurisdiction premises,93 the driving force in Europe has been a broadly ad-
vanced human rights regime.94 Despite these very different historical con-
texts in which corporate personhood issues arose, the approach by the 
ECHR and the Supreme Court is very similar in result and apparently also 
in methodology when extending fundamental rights protection to corpora-
tions.95 Both courts have featured a pro-business line of jurisprudence and 
have applied a broad set of constitutional rights in the United States and 
fundamental rights in the EU to corporations. 
Further, with regard to the methodology applied when determining the 
applicability of rights protections to corporations, it seems that both courts 
share many similarities. Their interpretation of respective rights guarantees 
 
 91  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 92  See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
 93  See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 557–59 (1844). 
 94  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 111 (showing that the ECHR has “settled on a surprisingly 
favorable view of the applicability of the rights and entitlement to corporate claimants.”). 
 95  See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146 . 
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is guided in both instances by “pragmatism” rather than theory.96 Both sys-
tems employ a practice of judicial pragmatism that determines the applica-
bility of rights guarantees to corporations based upon whether such claims 
would effectively advance the broader interests that the U.S. Constitution 
and the European Convention on Human Rights seek to protect. Thus, the 
question is not primarily framed as a matter of ontology,97 in terms of 
whether corporations have rights, but rather as a matter of teleology,98 in 
terms of what broader interests are served.99 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court early addressed the nature of the 
corporation to inform the question of constitutional rights guarantees of 
corporations.100 However, the recent case law of the Supreme Court seems 
to signal a shift from “ontology to teleology” on the issue of corporate con-
stitutional rights starting with its 1978 decision in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti (dealing with corporate election spending as a form of po-
litical speech). In its judgment, the Court explicitly elaborated that, in the 
Court’s view, the “question . . . whether and to what extent corporations 
have first amendment rights . . . pose[s] the wrong question. [Rather,] [t]he 
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking 
their vindication.”101 According to the Court, the broader interest protected 
by the First Amendment is (political) speech as an indispensable element of 
decision-making in a democratic society. “[T]his is no less true because the 
speech comes from a corporation.”102 
This interpretative approach was re-affirmed in Citizens United in 
2010, where the Supreme Court held that the speaker’s corporate identity is 
irrelevant and does not justify speech restrictions by the government.103 The 
 
 96  See Mayer, supra note 29, at 639; see also EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 134–37. 
 97  The “theory or conception relating to the nature of being” (in this case of the corporation), On-
tology, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131551? 
redirectedFrom=ontology&print (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).  
 98  “The doctrine or study of ends or final causes.” Teleology, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198710?redirectedFrom=teleology&print (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2014) 
 99  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978) (holding that [political] 
speech is “indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,” even if it is a corporation that speaks); 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 711, ¶ 53(3) (1979) 
(holding that the Convention is “an Instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values 
of democratic society”). 
 100 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76 (1906) (granting Fourth Amendment protection to corpora-
tions since the latter are “but an association of individuals;” on the other hand, the Court held the right 
against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment inapplicable to corporations as corporations are 
mere “creature[s] of the State,” what is a rendition of the artificial entity theory [i.e., concession theory] 
rather than the previous natural entity theory [i.e., association theory]); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
 101 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–76. 
 102 Id. at 777. 
 103 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364, 376 (2010). 
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Court followed its line of reasoning from Bellotti that is grounded in the 
underlying theory of the First Amendment suggesting that free speech ad-
vances democracy.104 On the premise of the democratic function of the free 
speech clause, the Court construed the purpose of the First Amendment as 
protecting the “open market place of ideas,” where ideas “may compete” 
freely “without government interference.”105 
This understanding places emphasis on speech as the protected prerog-
ative of the First Amendment rather than the rights of the speaker, thus ren-
dering the corporate identity of the rights applicant irrelevant for the analy-
sis. Citizens United has been an important milestone in the Supreme Court’s 
corporate rights jurisprudence. With its Citizens United decision, the Court 
resolved a conflict between contradictory lines of precedent, namely “a pre-
Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity and a post-Austin line permitting them.”106 Unlike the Court’s pre-
vious decision in Bellotti, the Court made a shift in Austin towards account-
ing for the corporate identity of the speaker. 
The Court based its decision in Austin on an “antidistortion” ra-
tionale,107 according to which government regulation is permissible in order 
to contain the distortive effect of the business corporation on the “political 
marketplace.”108 The Court did not only hold the corporate identity of the 
speaker to be highly relevant; its decisions in Austin and then MCFL also 
suggest a distinction in the corporate form that instructed the Court’s analy-
sis and result. Thus, it distinguished between for-profit and non-profit cor-
porations in the context of (electoral) political speech and upheld statutory 
restrictions against the former but not the latter.109 The reasoning advanced 
by the Court was the danger of “corrosive influence of concentrated corpo-
rate wealth” that exists with regard to the participation of for-profit corpora-
tions in the political arena whereas the same risks are not posed by nonprof-
it corporations despite their corporate form.110 The Court in Citizens United 
rejected Austin’s anti-distortion rationale by overruling the judgment and on 
 
 104 Id. at 323.  
 105 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008). 
 106 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313.  
 107 See id. at 348 (stating that “[t]o bypass Buckley and Bellotti, the Austin Court identified a new 
governmental interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest”) 
 108 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (holding that “[the] state-created advantages 
. . . permit [corporations] to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace.’” (emphasis added)), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 109 Austin, 494 U.S. at 661 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263) (emphasizing that nonprofit corporations 
have “features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms,” thus, statutory re-
strictions on their campaign finance spending are unconstitutional). 
 110 Id. at 660 (pointing to the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form”) 
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the proposition voiced by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin, “that there is no 
such thing as too much speech.”111 It thereby dismissed the “concern about 
corporate domination of the political process”112 in favor of an unrestricted 
marketplace of ideas. 
Prominent First Amendment scholars, such as Martin Redish, have 
supported this position in a free speech context arguing that “neither the 
fact that expression has been paid for, nor the presence of an underlying 
motivation of profit maximization detracts from the social, political, or con-
stitutional values”113 of corporate speech. In fact, he reaffirms that “if mon-
ey talks, then restricting the use of money in the expressive market place 
silences.”114 The notion of adversary democracy, where unfettered political 
speech between competing points of view should lead to good governance, 
offers a compelling explanation for the Supreme Court’s position in Citi-
zens United that negates the relevance of the corporate nature of the speaker 
for First Amendment purposes. The theory of adversary democracy 
acknowledges that democracy presupposes (in a descriptive and normative 
manner) conflict between competing interests in society.115 It is exactly this 
competition that helps people realize their self-ruling function in a demo-
cratic society.116 
Rather than theories of collective democracy, which understand de-
mocracy as a cooperative pursuit of a “common will” or “general wel-
fare,”117 the notion of adversary democracy is able to accommodate asym-
metries between self-interested behavior and the public interest.118 
Construing the normative purpose of the First Amendment in terms of ad-
versary democracy therefore extends the scope of the constitutional guaran-
tee to all speech even if “the speaker seeks to advance her own personal in-
terests rather than those other public at large.”119 On this premise, also 
inherently selfish speech, such as commercial speech, is protected since it 
promotes diversity and competition of interests that can be considered a 
catalyst for democracy.120 This provides a plausible reasoning for why the 
Supreme Court dismissed the doctrine of the distortive effect of corporate 
wealth (by overruling Austin).121 
Still, while the corporate identity of the rights applicant has not been 
deemed decisive in the case of corporate speech rights in Bellotti and Citi-
 
 111 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 472 (2010) (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
 112 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. 
 113 MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS 2 (2002).  
 114 Id. at 3.  
 115 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2013).  
 116 See id. at 2.  
 117 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 118 See REDISH, supra note 115, at 76–77. 
 119 REDISH, supra note 115, at 4. 
 120 Id. at 5. 
 121 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
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zens United, a more nuanced look reveals that the Court is not entirely 
oblivious to corporate theory and the intrinsic characteristics of the corpora-
tion in its analysis either. Thus, in both cases the Court addresses the con-
cern of competing interests of a company’s shareholders and how these 
conflicts can be remedied.122 While the Court has dismissed the concern of 
distortive effects of corporate speech on the external political process, 
based on the underlying purpose of the free speech clause, it is often over-
looked that the Court remains sensitive to the concern of intra-corporate 
conflicts of competing interests. This holds true in the corporate speech 
context and even more so with regard to corporate privacy claims. This per-
spective therefore provides important lessons for European Courts, current-
ly wrestling with the prerogatives of corporate personhood. But it also pro-
vides some clarity in face of the perceived obscurity of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of corporate rights under the Constitution.123 
As Section III will elaborate, this article argues that corporate theory is 
relevant to inform the analysis on corporate personhood (and related entity 
rights at a constitutional level) in order to avoid or mitigate intra-corporate 
conflict in multi-shareholder corporations. Approaching corporate person-
hood through the lens of corporate theory prompts the question on what ba-
sis corporate directors and management can override the interest of their 
shareholders and other constituencies. One might be hard pressed to find a 
reason why a corporation should enjoy constitutionally protected rights that 
are conflicting with competing shareholder interests. This is particularly 
true for bill of rights that are non-commercial in their nature and do not pro-
tect corporate property. It seems questionable to argue that the separation of 
ownership and control in the corporate form and the agency costs that 
shareholders incur as a trade-off for benefits of the corporate form, such as 
limited liability, might justify treating corporations as homogenous entities 
in their own right under the Constitution while disregarding competing in-
terests of their shareholders in that analysis. This proposition, as will be 
shown below, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents both pre- 
and post-Citizens United. 
 
 
 122 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787, 794–95 (1978) (discussing the “interest 
in protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on be-
half of the corporation” as a justification for statutory restrictions on corporate speech and concluding 
that shareholders are “competent to protect their own interests” by virtue of “the procedures of corporate 
democracy”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361 (debating the government “interest in protecting dissent-
ing shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech,” deferring again to intracor-
porate remedies for shareholders).  
 123 See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497 (2011); Krannich, supra note 
56, at 62.  
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 B. The Transatlantic Discrepancy: Corporate Theory within 
Corporate Personhood 
The following sections will rebut this conventional wisdom that the 
United States and Europe have embarked on the same path of a policy-
informed judicial pragmatism in their corporate personhood jurisprudence 
without recourse to corporate theory. Rather, the U.S. doctrine proves to be 
much more nuanced with regard to the structural complexities of the corpo-
rate form. As will be shown below, in the preponderance of its opinions, the 
Supreme Court has placed the emphasis where it should be: the nature of 
the corporate structure itself. 
While scholars have alleged that there is a common focus on teleology 
rather than ontology in the corporate rights jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and the ECHR,124 little attention has been given to potential differ-
ences in methodology, specifically the role of corporate theory or the lack 
thereof in European jurisprudence. Unlike the Supreme Court, the ECHR 
has followed a solely policy-oriented approach that does not account for the 
nature of the corporation as a legal person with distinct attributes under the 
law and with responsibilities towards its shareholders, as its main constitu-
ency. Thus, the ECHR has justified the applicability of the protections un-
der the Convention merely on the basis of a test that asks whether the cor-
porate claim is promoting and maintaining general Convention values, 
without taking into account potential intra-corporate conflicts, especially 
with regard to competing shareholder interests.125 By under-accounting for 
the characteristics of the corporation, the ECHR has granted the same guar-
antees to corporations as to individual persons without any further examina-
tion. A discussion about the nature and structure of the corporation as a le-
gal person and how it informs questions pertaining to the “human rights” of 
corporate entities, is entirely missing in the jurisprudence of the ECHR.126 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has long been wrestling with 
the corporate personhood question and how it might inform the applicabil-
ity of constitutional protections under the Bill of Rights to corporations.127 
The jurisprudence by the Supreme Court therefore provides a rich source 
for lessons that can inform Europe’s approach in the realm of corporate 
constitutional rights. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
 
 124 See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1496, 1496 (1975); 
EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 146; see also Mayer, supra note 29, at 634. 
 125 The European Court on Human Rights has explicitly embraced a mode of interpretation that en-
sures that the right guarantees are “practical and effective” in a way that is promoting the underlying 
values of the Convention. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21–22 (1981).  
 126 See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002); Autronic AG v. 
Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990). 
 127 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–76 
(1906). 
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case law reveals that the role of corporate theory has not been reflected en-
tirely accurately in the literature. Specifically, it will be shown that the ju-
risprudence of the Court does not signal a shift away from the ontology of 
the corporation, but rather is emblematic of a methodology that is sensitive 
to the corporate nature of the rights applicant and the multi-dimensional 
character of the corporate form in light of the purpose of the respective 
rights provision. Despite the dicta in Citizens United that “[n]o sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or 
for-profit corporations,”128 the facts in this landmark case have not dealt 
with multi-shareholder for-profit corporations.129 Therefore, even on the 
premise of the majority opinion in Citizens United, it is still crucial to ask 
the question how this ruling would impact for-profit corporations if it were 
presented to the Justices. It would require a more sophisticated analysis 
than the dicta of Citizens United offers. 
 III. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY 
There is an important role that corporate theory about the nature of the 
firm can play in the corporate personhood doctrine. Specifically, it can help 
account for competing interests of shareholders and other stakeholders and 
avoid intra-corporate conflicts within the doctrine, as subsection A exam-
ines. In subsection B, the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is exam-
ined with an eye towards the role of corporate theory in the legal analysis 
and shows that corporate theory has been a consistent part of the Supreme 
Court’s portfolio of methodologies for corporate personhood. Major cases 
that are critical to this analysis include Citizens United, Bellotti, FCC v. 
AT&T, Hale v. Henkel, Morton Salt, Hobby Lobby. This aim of resurrecting 
shareholder and constituency protection within the corporate personhood 
doctrine emerges as critical to account for the complex organizational na-
ture of the corporate form. Finally, as examined in subsection C, the Euro-
pean experience demonstrates the negative consequences if the essence of 
corporate personhood, in other words, the nature of the firm and the diversi-
ty of interests of its constituents, including shareholder and other stakehold-
ers, is ignored. 
 A. Competing Interests of Corporate Constituents 
While constitutional protections of corporate speech, documents, and 
contracts have been looked at primarily through the lens of constitutional 
law, several scholars have highlighted the importance of corporate theory to 
address these and related issues. Thus, it has correctly been argued that 
 
 128 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (emphasis added).  
 129 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 791–92.  
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solving questions relating to “the constitutional limits of government power 
. . . often depends on how the corporation is characterized.”130 The choice of 
corporate theory has important implications for the nature and scope of cor-
porate constitutional rights.131  
This poses the question what contemporary notion of the corporation 
most accurately describes its unique characteristics and intra-structural dy-
namics. As elaborated above, the understanding and treatment of the corpo-
rate form is intrinsically situated in the socio-economic context of its time. 
During much of the 19th century, the “concession theory” was dominating 
the legal discourse on the nature of the corporation.132 Accordingly, the cor-
poration was perceived as an artificial entity created by the state and en-
dowed with the privilege of incorporation.133 In the early 19th century, the 
Supreme Court described the corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law” and as such “the 
mere creature of law.”134 The rise of general chartering in numerous states 
in the second half of the 19th century can be considered a watershed mo-
ment in the way legal theory viewed corporations. It marked an end to the 
concession theory as the prominent legal doctrine with the new incorpora-
tion rules changing the very premise of this view that considered the corpo-
ration a mere artificial creation of the state at its discretion and with the 
power to extensively regulate corporate activity.135 Democratizing access to 
business corporations as investment vehicles with beneficial legal character-
istics has had a lasting impact on corporate legal theory. Specifically, gen-
eral incorporation acts “moved the predominant role in corporate organiza-
tion from the state to the incorporators and shareholders.”136 The 
democratizing effect of general incorporation rules has amplified the role of 
shareholders as the primary constituency of the modern form of the busi-
ness corporation.  
The changes in incorporation rules gave rise to the association theory, 
according to which a corporation is perceived and treated as a mere aggre-
gation of its members, in terms of individual shareholders.137 While the as-
sociation correctly, and most importantly, accounts for the constituent role 
 
 130 Ribstein, supra note 11, at 96. 
 131 See id. at 108.  
 132 See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1635–
40. 
 133 See Millon, supra note 51, at 202; see also William Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1989).  
 134 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 135 Some argue for a revival of the concession/grant theory. See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 224 
(claiming that “the association theory and real entity theory are mistaken” and that the concession theory 
provides the only coherent solution).  
 136 Philip Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 283, 293 (1990).  
 137 See Krannich, supra note 56, at 72.  
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of the shareholders,138 it has been argued that it takes the metaphor of the 
corporation as a mere aggregation of individual human beings too far.139 
Contrary to what the association theory suggests, the corporation is not a 
perfect partnership in the traditional sense,140 but rather sui generis in its 
own nature and structure and with the intra-corporate dynamics that accom-
pany it.141 Thus, unlike in a partnership, the corporation has a separate iden-
tity of its own: its contracts, property, and liabilities are separate from its 
shareholders.142 It is hard to comprehend why this basic principle of corpo-
rate law should not also apply to the question of corporate rights in a consti-
tutional context. Viewing the corporation merely as a proxy for its members 
and their rights143 ignores the separate identity of the corporation under the 
law. 
After all, the corporate form disposes of some features that cannot pos-
sibly be established by means of private initiative (i.e., contracts) between 
individual members, namely limited liability and entity shielding.144 Rather, 
some of the unique characteristics of the corporation that set it apart from a 
partnership exist only by virtue of statutory law.145 The Supreme Court has 
displayed this understanding about the nature of the corporate form on sev-
eral counts. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court de-
 
 138 See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774 (arguing that “corporate personality is merely a . . . meta-
phor for a complex set of underlying human activities and relationships”) 
 139 See Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1022 (pointing to the “aggregation problem” in terms that 
“[t]he decision of a group . . . can be quite different from the decisions of the members taken individual-
ly.”) 
 140 See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 226; see also Greenwood, supra note 11, at 15 (suggesting that 
corporate speech is not merely “an instance of ordinary group speech”). 
 141 See Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1032, 1042 (identifying the agency problem within the corpo-
ration as function of the fiction of that “the profit motive [is] the primary reason investors participate,” 
thus ignoring the “diversity of shareholders” and their interests. In other words, arguing that much of the 
intra-corporate conflicts result from the fact that “corporate speakers are agents answerable to a princi-
ple, not a principal.” [emphasis added]; see also Ribstein, supra note 11, at 99 (suggesting that the sepa-
ration of ownership and control has the effect “that corporate property will not be used efficiently unless 
the managers are subject to special legal constraints”). 
 142 The notion of the corporate person as its own entity is still prevalent even after the demise of the 
“concession theory” at the end of the 19th century. The end of the government’s chartering authority did 
not mark the end of corporate person theory, as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms. See Rib-
stein, supra note 11, at 98; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354–55 
(2010) (treating the corporate entity as a “speaker” under the 1st Amendment.); United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (emphasizing that corporations “are endowed with public attributes 
[and] have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial 
entities”). 
 143 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 788 (describing “corporate personality as a centralized enforcement 
agent” for the “interests of decentralized corporate shareholders”). 
 144 Proponents of the “contractual theory” on the other hand, view the corporation as a mere nexus 
of contracts. See generally Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEORGE 
MASON UNIV. L. REV. 99. See also BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1995).  
 145 See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 98. 
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scribed the corporation as a “unique state-conferred . . . structure” that dis-
poses of special features such as “limited liability, perpetual life, and favor-
able treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”146 Also, in 
Morton, the Court emphasizes the “public attributes” that the corporation 
derives from the state.147 
There is a range of corporate governance theories that address the 
question about how to balance corporate decision-making between man-
agement and shareholders. According to the theory of shareholder primacy, 
managers are considered their agents of the shareholders in running the 
business, which results in the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to fur-
ther the interests of shareholders, often paired with a call by scholars and 
commentators for increasing shareholder governance powers within the 
corporation.148 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, on the other hand, argue in 
favor of a “team production” theory that treats directors as “‘mediating hi-
erarchs’ whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests” there-
by serving the interests of the entire corporate entity.149 While some have 
proposed a theory of director primacy that confers broad discretion on man-
agement in the pursuit of pure shareholder value maximization,150 Blair and 
Stout allow management to take into account non-shareholder interests in 
their decision making process.151  
These theories illustrate the spectrum of views on the power allocation 
within the corporation. However, there is a clear common thread that be-
comes apparent. Under these theories, the interests of shareholders guide 
management decision-making in the modern corporation, but the theories 
differ on the extent of management’s independence. It is therefore fair to 
say that modern corporate law is premised on the pursuit of shareholder in-
terests,152 while at the same time acknowledging the corporation as an entity 
created by private initiative and market forces.153 This leads to complex in-
tra-corporate dynamics and competing interests within the corporate form 
that need to be accounted for when dealing with the question of constitu-
 
 146 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658, 660 (1990). While the Supreme 
Court overruled Austin, finding the anti-distortion rationale does not hold, the case still provides useful 
guidance as to how the Court views the nature and structure of the corporation. 
 147 Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652. 
 148 See generally Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992). 
 149 Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
291 (1999).  
 150 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 604 (2006). 
 151 Blair & Stout, supra note 149, at 253 
 152 See Einer Elhauge, supra note 17, at 735–36; MICHAEL DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CORPORATION LAW 97 (1995); ADOLF BERLE JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220–32 (1932).  
 153 See Millon, supra note 53, at 202–203. 
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tional rights of corporations. 
While the Supreme Court in Citizens United has overruled Austin’s an-
ti-distortion rationale that deals with the impact of corporate wealth on so-
ciety in a democratic system, the impact on the interests of shareholders still 
requires a thorough examination by the courts. Simply extending rights to 
corporations as if they were natural persons would ignore a major com-
plexity that is inherent in the very nature and design of the corporation, i.e., 
the legal separation of the corporate entity and its shareholders. In order to 
shed light on the question whether and to what extent corporations should 
have constitutional rights, it is crucial first to recognize that the corporation 
is not a homogenous entity but it is characterized by internal dynamics and 
potentially competing interests.154 Those intra-corporate tensions trace back 
to the separation of ownership and control within the corporate governance 
structure. Thus, “modern corporate law, by locating the center of corporate 
authority in a board of directors . . . , makes clear that the shareholders . . . 
have no right to run the corporation or determine its goals.”155 
This separation creates opportunities for abuse of power by corporate 
management that requires checks and balances in the form of legal con-
straints.156 The fiduciary duty owed by management to the corporation, and 
therefore ultimately to the shareholders, addresses this need. Against the 
backdrop of this inherent tension in the corporate form, one should pause 
before arguing that that competing shareholder interests could simply be 
overridden without a thorough analysis of remedies available for sharehold-
ers, especially minority ones. While it is the common understanding that the 
benefits of using the corporate form as an investment vehicle come at a 
price,157 namely in the form of agency costs, this rationale does not easily 
extend to or even hold true with regard to non-commercial aspects, such as 
political speech or privacy prerogatives of the corporate entity. Daniel 
Greenwood characterizes the questions pertaining to corporate speech as a 
special form of an agency problem in terms of “role morality.”158 He claims 
that traditionally, “[a]gency cost theory . . . treats the interests of sharehold-
ers as deeply unproblematic and deeply antipolitical.”159 Corporate law op-
erates on the fiction that shareholders are entirely “monolithic” and there-
fore are only motivated by one single-unified goal, profit maximization, and 
 
 154 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 789 (about “intracorporate conflicts” in multishareholder corpora-
tions.) See also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561 (2006).  
 155 Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1007–08. 
 156 See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 96, 99.  
 157 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976). 
 158 Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1038. 
 159 Id. at 1040. 
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the economic return on their investment.160 In the context of corporate 
speech, Greenwood describes this legal phenomenon accurately by stating 
that “[c]orporate speakers are agents answerable to a principle [i.e., the pri-
macy of the profit motive of shareholders], not a principal [i.e., the share-
holders with their actual values and interests].”161 
While this seems appropriate when management makes business deci-
sions that are primarily commercial in nature, it raises serious questions 
when the corporation is entering the “political market place” by virtue of 
corporate speech or is exercising other non-commercial bill of rights, such 
as privacy.162 Shareholders cannot be seen as part of the legal fiction of a 
unified and single goal of profit maximization, but rather should be con-
ceived as part of a group of individuals with diverse values and interests, 
economic and otherwise, which can significantly deviate from manage-
ment’s interests.163 Greenwood puts it concisely when he explains that 
“[t]he humans who stand behind the shares have various and conflicting 
goals, as all people do: they want their shares to increase in value, of 
course, but they may also want decent jobs for their kids or neighbors, at-
tractive and safe cities, a clean environment, and other things that, from 
time to time, conflict with the increase in value of their shares.”164 Unlike 
when the corporation makes ordinary investment decisions, where man-
agement is enjoying great discretion under the “business judgment rule,” a 
different standard seems necessary when the corporation is claiming politi-
cal rights as a citizen under the constitution.165 In this instance, corporations 
should be treated like a legal group (rather than a fiction), when determin-
ing whether and to what extent corporations can claim constitutional or 
fundamental rights that were originally and traditionally intended for natu-
ral persons. 
It is crucial that corporate theory about the nature of the firm informs 
the debate on corporate constitutional rights so that competing interests of 
shareholders are taken into account and intra-corporate conflicts are avoid-
ed. European courts in particular need to recognize corporations as complex 
organizational creatures with different constituents and a diversity of inter-
ests that can be aligned but that can also be at odds with each other. Failing 
to do that can lead to intra-corporate conflicts resulting from the diversity of 
shareholder and other stakeholder interests that can be at odds with the in-
terests of management, especially when we are talking about extending 
non-commercial rights to corporations. 
 
 160 Id. at 1037. 
 161 Id. at 1042. 
 162 See Ciepley, supra note 14, at 225. 
 163 See Iman Anabtawi, supra note 156 (arguing that the largest modern shareholders have private 
interests that are both substantial and in conflict with maximizing overall shareholder value.)  
 164 Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1040–41. 
 165 See id. at 1019.  
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The existence of competing shareholder interests does not necessarily 
and automatically require barring corporations from rights protections un-
der the Bill of Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights all to-
gether. Rather, a detailed and critical analysis of the available remedies for 
shareholders under the respective legal or economic systems is required. 
 B. The Relevance of the Corporate Identity in U.S. Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence  
The corporate personhood debate has a long history in the practice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Citizens United can be understood as a watershed 
moment, where the Supreme Court solved the tension between different 
(contradictory) strands of its precedents concerning corporate speech re-
strictions. The Court described the dilemma that it was facing: “[This] 
Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin 
line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s cor-
porate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”166 Looking at the 
last century of the Court’s case law, some commentators have argued that 
the Court’s debate on the status of corporations under the Constitution in-
creasingly has moved away from an analysis that is informed by ontology 
and thus by corporate theory.167 Indeed, Citizens United explicitly over-
turned Austin and thus “returns to the principle established in Buckley and 
Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”168 
Citizens United can be seen as the penultimate manifestation of corpo-
rate personhood on the premise that the corporation is a real/natural entity 
with its own “voice.”169 On its face, one might conclude that Citizens Unit-
ed (and its reference to Bellotti) achieved total rights equality between cor-
porations, as legal persons, and natural persons. The corporate identity of 
the speaker is perceived as irrelevant and does not justify speech re-
strictions.170 Rather, corporate speech restrictions are subject to strict scruti-
ny, which requires the Government to show that the statutory restriction 
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that in-
terest.”171 
In the discussion below, we explore American jurisprudence that de-
fines corporate personhood. Five landmark cases chart the reasoning of the 
 
 166 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010). 
 167 See, for example, Mayer, supra note 29, at 629–51 (arguing the “demise of corporate theory” and 
the Court’s interpretative shift “from theory to pragmatism”). 
 168 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. 
 169 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, WISCONSIN L. REV. 999, 1040 
(2010). 
 170 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364, 376. 
 171 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 546 U.S. 410, 464 (2007).  
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Supreme Court. Citizens United and FCC v. AT&T reveal that the Court’s 
methodological approach is coherent with regard to the application of cor-
porate theory in light of the narrow cases before it; a reasoned analysis of 
both cases demonstrates that (despite contrary voices in the scholarship) 
corporate theory has not been abandoned in general by the Court. Hale v. 
Henkel, Morton Salt, Bellotti, and Hobby Lobby further explain the role of 
corporate theory (about the nature of the firm) as a common thread of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence over the course of the last century. 
 1. A Reasoned Understanding of Citizens United and FCC v. AT&T 
However, despite contrary voices in the scholarship,172 no truly au-
thentic conclusion can be drawn from Citizens United regarding the role of 
corporate theory in the corporate personhood debate. It is not that the ma-
jority of justices would necessarily dispute the logic of putting the “corpo-
rate” back into corporate personhood, but they are simply reaching deci-
sions on a different plane of analysis in the narrow case before them. 
Citizens United does not mark a general course change in the conception of 
corporate personhood, but it decides a specific case with facts that did not 
require an in-depth examination of corporate theory and competing interest 
of shareholders.173  
The decisive lynchpin that determines the Court’s methodology in this 
case is the nature of the free speech right. In his dissent, Justice John Paul 
Stevens concisely describes the majority opinion’s reasoning as follows: 
Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, the 
Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation’s right to elec-
tioneer, but rather on the listener’s interest in hearing what every 
possible speaker may have to say. The Court’s central argument is 
that laws such as § 203 have “deprived [the electorate] of infor-
mation, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,” [majority opin-
ion, at 38], and this “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas 
protected by the First Amendment.”174 
The lack of corporate theory in the analysis of the Court is consistent 
with the purpose of the First Amendment as described by the Roberts Court 
and First Amendment scholars, namely to protect speech rather than the 
rights of the speaker.175 Thus, with this understanding of the First Amend-
 
 172 See, e.g., Mayer supra note 29, at 629. 
 173 See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 79–92; Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associa-
tions: Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 109–
10 (2014). 
 174 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 175 See Martin Redish & Howard Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech 
and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237 (1998) (suggesting that 
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ment as being non-speaker-centric leads to an analysis by the Court that is 
not (heavily) informed by corporate theory simply because it is not decisive 
in this case, i.e., in a free speech context under the U.S. Constitution.176  
This does not mean, however, that the Court dismissed corporate theo-
ry in general and for all cases involving corporate constitutional rights. 
Specifically, in its 2011 decision in Federal Communications Commission 
v. AT&T177, the first corporate rights decision by the Court following Citi-
zens United, the Court demonstrated that the corporate identity might not 
always be irrelevant. Unlike Citizens United, this case dealt with corporate 
privacy considerations against mandated disclosure of financial and other 
business information under the Fourth Amendment. In its judgment in FCC 
v. ATT, the Supreme Court follows in the footsteps of its early analysis in 
Hale v. Henkel and Morton Salt, where the Court relied heavily on corpo-
rate theory in order to determine the scope and limits of corporate privacy 
rights.178 In FCC v. AT&T, the Court re-focused on the nature of the corpo-
ration as a rights holder with a “formalist” and “linguistic analysis”179 that 
points towards a disconnect between the notion of corporations as “per-
sons” and the attribute of “personal” privacy.180 The Roberts Court rejected 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that “‘personal’ must mean relating to 
those ‘person[s]’ [as defined in the statute]: namely, corporations and other 
entities as well as individuals.”181 Greenwood accurately restates the hold-
ing of the Court as follows: “In ordinary English usage, corporations do not 
have ‘personal’ privacy. While the word ‘person’ often includes corpora-
tions in legal jargon, the adjective ‘personal’ does not carry that special 
 
“[r]egardless of the expression’s source, such speech undoubtedly has the effect of aiding the self-
realization of the recipients of that expression.”); see also Citizens United, at 349 (majority opinion) 
(reaffirming Bellotti byholding that “political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democra-
cy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation’”) (internal citation omitted); 
see also Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and The Free Flow of Information: Towards a Real-
istic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 258 (2004). 
 176 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775–76 (1978), which holds that the 
“question whether and to what extent corporations have first amendment rights . . . pose[s] the wrong 
question. [Rather,] [t]he Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their 
vindication.” 
 177 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131. S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011). 
 178 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906) (focusing its analysis on corporate theory, the Court 
employed the artificial entity theory to deny corporations fifth amendment protections, while granting 
them fourth amendment protections based on the rational of the real entity theory. This Court has often 
been criticized for this “schizophrenic view on corporate personality.” Mayer, supra note 29, at 621; 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (applying the artificial entity theory and 
concluding that the privilege of incorporation from the government “carries with [it] an enhanced meas-
ure of regulation.”)  
 179 Daniel Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T: The Idolatry of Corporations and Impersonal Privacy, 2011 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ON-LINE, http://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/fcc-v-att-the-idolatry-of-
corporations-and-impersonal-privacy/. 
 180 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1181.  
 181 Id. at 1181 (citing Brief of Resp. AT&T 8, 14–15). 
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meaning. ‘Personal’ is the opposite of bureaucratic, impersonal, or business, 
not its synonym, and ‘personal privacy’ never means ‘business secrets.’”182 
The Court has taken a bifurcated approach to corporate personhood 
under the Constitution, as manifested in the dichotomy between its early 
case law in Hale v. Henkel and Morton Salt, and its decision in Bellotti and 
its recent ruling in Citizens United. In the latter judgment, the Court fol-
lowed an approach where the speaker is irrelevant and the applicability of 
corporate rights is determined by a teleological approach. In light of the 
Court’s linguistic analysis in FCC v. AT&T that hinges heavily on the na-
ture of the corporation, Daniel Greenwood criticizes the Court’s perpetuat-
ing inconsistency as follows: “Why is ordinary meaning important here, but 
irrelevant when corporations assert constitutional rights that the text grants 
only to human beings?”183 
The “free marketplace of ideas” paradigm under the First Amend-
ment,184 which disregards the corporate nature of the rights holders, and the 
“personal privacy” paradigm,185 which relies exactly on the corporate nature 
of the rights holders, are not intrinsically inconsistent. Rather, how pro-
nounced the corporate theory analysis is in each case depends on the extent 
to which it is influenced by the underlying purpose of the respective Bill of 
Rights provision.186 
The First Amendment protects not only the “self-expression of the 
communicator” but also of the “right to hear or receive information” as a 
function of “the interchange of ideas.”187 One could argue that the protec-
tion extends to a ‘third-party beneficiary’ that is distinct from the actual 
rights holder. Larry Ribstein points out that “[th]e First Amendment does 
not guard corporations’ expressive rights, but rather the public’s interest in 
hearing what corporations have to say.”188 The debate on corporate protec-
tions under the Fourth Amendment on the other hand illustrates that corpo-
rate theory can play a crucial role when determining the applicability of cer-
tain constitutional rights to corporations. Unlike speech rights, privacy 
rights are, by their very nature, intrinsically dependent on the human or 
corporate nature of the rights holder.189 The purpose of privacy rights is to 
 
 182 Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T, supra note 179. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810 (1978) (emphasizing “the role of 
the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”); see also New York State Bd. of 
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008).  
 185 Federal Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180 (2011). 
 186 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (1978) (holding that “[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is 
. . . unavailable to corporations . . . depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitu-
tional provision.”) 
 187 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) 
 188 Larry Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 
1022, 1022 (2010). 
 189 See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177–78 (2011), which holds that “‘personal privacy’ 
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protect the rights holder first and foremost, specifically from arbitrary gov-
ernment intrusion, and secure an inalienable sphere of personal privacy.190 
It is thereby a function of personal liberty in the United States.191 
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court relied heavily on corporate 
theory and related questions about the nature of the corporation in its debate 
on corporate protections under the Fourth Amendment. The practice of the 
Court has been extremely consistent in this regard over the last century. The 
Court’s early analysis in Hale v. Henkel was deeply grounded in corporate 
theory and the discussion about corporate personality.192 However, the deci-
sion is not cohesive with regard to the specific corporate theory that is ap-
plied by the Court; rather, the decision is a reflection of the deep divergence 
over legal questions pertaining to corporate personality at the time.193 Thus, 
while the Court granted Fourth Amendment protections to corporations on 
grounds of the natural entity theory,194 it denied the corporate form Fifth 
Amendment protections based on the artificial entity theory.195 Granted, this 
“two-faced view of the corporation” has been perceived as mysterious by 
the scholarship,196 yet the Court shows a clear adherence to methodology 
that is deeply informed by corporate theory in its analysis. The Court con-
tinued to decide corporate Fourth Amendment cases on the bases of corpo-
rate theory, this time the artificial entity theory. In Morton Salt, when deal-
ing with Fourth Amendment protections against broad government requests 
for document production (regarding pricing, among others), the Court 
pointed to the “privilege of acting as an artificial person” that corporations 
derive from society.197 This reiteration of the artificial entity theory led the 
Court to allow such government requests even if they were “caused by 
nothing more than official curiosity.”198 
The most recent corporate privacy case that the Supreme Court exam-
ined, namely FCC v. AT&T, discusses the corporate identity of the rights 
claimant in terms of semantics, rather than legal doctrines about corporate 
 
[under the Freedom of Information Act] . . . conveys more than just ‘of a person’; it suggests a type of 
privacy evocative of human concerns—not usually associated with an entity like AT&T.” 
 190 See Anita Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual 
Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 629 (1987). 
 191 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
 192 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906). 
 193 See Mayer, supra note 29, 622; see also Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: 
Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 139 (2013) 
 194 Hale, 201 U.S. at 76. 
 195 Id. at 75.  
 196 See Mayer, supra note 29, at 622; see also Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29 
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 731, 741 (2013). 
 197 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).  
 198 Id. 
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personality.199 Yet, the corporate nature of the applicant is clearly relevant 
for the Court’s analysis in this case, unlike the impression to the contrary in 
Citizens United and Bellotti. The case of FCC v. AT&T also illustrates the 
important role of corporate theory as it provides a vehicle to account for 
competing interests of corporate constituents, including shareholders and 
potentially also stakeholders based on the prevailing doctrine of the corpo-
rate objective. Unlike other cases before, FCC v. AT&T did not deal with 
protections sought against intrusive government inquiries. Rather, FCC v. 
AT&T had already disclosed the information to the government and instead 
sued to prevent the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from dis-
closing the information to the public, “including AT&T’s investors, em-
ployees, customers, and competitors.”200 It is important to realize that “pri-
vacy rights that conceal the inner working of a business from view free the 
institution [i.e., the corporation] and its decision makers from responsibility 
to its stakeholders,”201 who might have a vested interest in disclosure of the 
information. This is particularly true for a company’s shareholders as a cor-
poration’s major constituency (and principal) under modern corporate law. 
Granting corporations a right to privacy might help to perpetuate illegal or 
anticompetitive business conduct and thus harm the shareholders’ invest-
ment as the main constituents of the corporate form. Over the last century, 
corporations were granted “privacy rights protection seclusion, confidenti-
ality, and [even] secrecy.”202 Especially the latter cases raise issues of po-
tentially competing shareholder and stakeholder interests that can be effec-
tively addressed by applying corporate theory.  
Even though the Court’s methodology in FCC v. AT&T might seem to 
be in tension with the approach in Bellotti and Citizens United, FCC v. 
AT&T in fact reinforces the test promulgated in Bellotti, as recently en-
dorsed in Citizens United. 
Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and 
other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular 
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. . . . 
Whether or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is una-
vailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, 
history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.203 
FCC v. AT&T focuses its analysis on whether a corporation can be as-
cribed “personal privacy” rights as an exemption of disclosure under the 
 
 199 Federal Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011). 
 200 Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T, supra note 179. 
 201 Id.  
 202 Allen, supra note 190, at 629. 
 203 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/15  12:18 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:591 (2015) 
626 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).204 
The rights-specific character of the Supreme Court’s corporate person-
hood jurisprudence should not be overstated, and more research is required 
to examine the historical purpose of free speech and particularly privacy 
rights under the Constitution with regard to corporations. However, it is fair 
to say that the status of corporations under the Constitution cannot be dis-
cussed in a vacuum, but needs to be seen in the context of the respective 
rights provisions. 
Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United, corpo-
rate theory is still relevant when determining corporate rights and regulatory 
powers of the state. Corporate theory might not always be a decisive factor 
in the analysis of the Court depending on the interpretation of the rights 
provision in question, but it did not vanish from the Supreme Court’s meth-
odological approach to corporate personhood in principle, as some com-
mentators have argued.205 It is still an integral part of the methodological 
approach by the Court, as the Court has most recently reaffirmed in its deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby, where understanding the nature, structure, and con-
stituents of the corporation remains highly relevant to the analysis.206 A 
study of the Supreme Court’s case law shows that, contrary to some voices 
in the scholarship, the Court has not dismissed corporate theory, 207 but ra-
ther subsumes it under larger objectives, such as democracy and the “free 
 
 204 FCC v. AT&T deals with a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, the Court emphasizes that 
“this case does not call upon us to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of 
constitutional or common law,” but rather it deals with a question of statutory interpretation. Federa 
Communications Comm’n (FCC) v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011). Still, FCC v. AT&T pro-
vides important lessons for the corporate personhood debate. Even if the privacy term under the FOIA 
might not be identical to the privacy concept under the 4th Amendment, it can be assumed that they are 
at least congruent. The scholarship has been discussing the case of FCC v. AT&T as a progression of the 
Court’s jurisprudence on corporate rights, especially since this has been the first decision after Citizens 
United dealing with the issue of corporate rights. See Mark Walsh, Making It Personal: Corporate 
Rights are Again at Issue as AT&T Wants to Keep Info a Secret, 97 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2011).  
 205 See Mayer, supra note 29, at 620 (arguing that “[a]fter 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing 
about corporate personhood.”) 
 206 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that “the purpose of 
extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the corporation.”); see 
also Id. at 15 (holding that “modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue 
profit at the expense of everything else”)  
 207 Compare Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Free-
dom of Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 5, 31 (2012) and 
Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations?: The Constitutionality of Limitations on Corporate Electoral 
Speech after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 307, 307-08, 318 (2011) with Anne Tucker, Flawed As-
sumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 516 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of corporate law to inform the Su-
preme Court’s corporate speech jurisprudence). For a compelling different view on the issue, see Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Queston of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
575, 581 (2012) (focusing on “citizenship” rather than “personhood” to address the issue of corporate 
political speech). 
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market of ideas,” if so mandated by the underlying purpose of the respec-
tive Bill of Rights provision.208 
 2. Resurrecting Shareholder and Constituency Protection within 
Corporate Personhood 
Citizens United (and, for that matter, the Bellotti standard) should not 
be considered the benchmark from which to draw conclusions on the role 
(or demise) of corporate theory in the American corporate personhood de-
bate for reasons set forth below. This is particularly true with regard to 
questions about how to treat competing shareholder and constituency (i.e. 
stakeholder) interests within the corporate personhood discussion.  
  (a) The Common Thread of Corporate Theory 
It is not that the majority of justices would necessarily dispute the log-
ic of putting corporate back into corporate personhood, but they are simply 
reaching decisions in the narrow case before them. On the facts of the case, 
Citizens United dealt with a nonprofit corporation. If one takes a conserva-
tive reading of the case, one must conclude that Citizens United has more 
limited implications for the corporate personhood debate than often ar-
gued.209 Acknowledging the significance of the ruling with regard to politi-
cal speech of non-profit corporations, it is important not to overinflate the 
ruling beyond the specific facts of the case. One can fully support of Citi-
zens United and still ask the question how this ruling would impact for-
profit corporations if such a case were presented to the nine Justices. It re-
mains open how the Supreme Court would decide a case where a major 
publicly held multi-shareholder company, such as Google Inc., for example, 
used general treasury funds to support a certain political candidate or simp-
ly to contribute to a debate on issues of general interest, such as public 
health, for example. The company’s management may find such corporate 
activities in line with the company’s motto and corporate culture of “do no 
evil,”210 but shareholders might have divergent interests, especially on con-
troversial issues of public policy.211  
It is often overlooked that while the Supreme Court in Citizens United 
 
 208 See Mayer, supra note 29, at 629, 633. 
 209 Allison R. Hayward, Citizens United: Correct, Modest, and Overdue, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 2–3 (arguing Citizens United had a narrow impact and left long-settled precedent intact), 
http://www.akronconlawjournal.com/articles/citizens-united-correct-modest-and-overdue.pdf. 
 210 See BENJAMIN EDELMAN & THOMAS EISENMANN, GOOGLE INC. 17, 19 (Harv. Bus. Pub. 2010). 
 211 It can be argued that no intracorporate conflict exists if management can show that the expendi-
tures made are in the corporation’s economic interest, such as lobbying efforts with regard to favorable 
legislation and regulation. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, 
J., dissenting). 
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overturned the anti-distortion rationale of Austin (dealing with the corrosive 
effects on the external political process), the Court has not yet spoken on 
the merits and in sufficient detail to the constitutional rights premises of 
multi-shareholder for-profit corporations and intra-corporate conflicts that 
might arise in those large corporations. Thus, “despite the dictum in Citi-
zens United—which actually dealt with the clearly protected speech of a 
nonprofit corporation similar to MCFL . . . it remains open how the Court 
would hold in a case where the speech was exercised by a multi-shareholder 
for-profit corporation.”212 Also, in its most recent decision in Hobby Lob-
by—dealing with the religious exercise of a closely held corporation solely 
owned by one single family—the Court again avoided (and incidentally 
glossed over) possible intra-corporate conflicts, which in fact existed with 
regard to numerous of Hobby Lobby’s employees.213  
Even in the cases where the Court has dealt with corporations in a non-
profit form, the Court raises the issue of conflicting shareholder interests, 
often in dicta.214 This can be understood as an indication that the Court’s 
holding in Citizens United, declaring that the corporate identity of the 
speaker is irrelevant in establishing its personhood under the First Amend-
ment,215 does not automatically hold true for the general status of corpora-
tions across the entire Bill of Rights and the Constitution. Rather, the 
Court’s treatment of intra-corporate conflicts and how they can be remedied 
at the internal corporate governance level, at the statutory level, or in the 
market place216 signals that the Court did not intend to dismiss corporate 
theory from the corporate personhood debate all together. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the Court on several occasions throughout the judgment has 
referred to different theories about corporate personality, including the real 
entity as well as the association theory.217 
Burt Neuborne has convincingly argued that, “in settings where intra-
corporate conflicts of interest are likely to exist, the [U.S. Supreme] Court 
 
 212 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 791-92. 
 213 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794–95 (2014) (Ginsberg, J., dis-
senting). 
 214 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010); Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675, 676 n.8 (1990) (While the Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce in this case characterizes as a nonprofit corporation, the Court still addresses the issue of 
“protection of dissenting shareholders” in “ordinary [i.e. forprofit] business corporations.” The Court 
reaffirms that “[w]e have long recognized the importance of state corporate law in ‘protect[ing] the 
shareholders’ of corporations chartered within the State.” (internal citation omitted)); Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986)) (emphasizing that MCFL “has 
no shareholders,” what “ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic 
disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity”). 
 215 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350, 376. 
 216 Id. 37-71; id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 217 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354, 356 (2010) (majority opinion) (characterizing the corpora-
tion as an “associations of citizens”); id. at 354–55 (referring to the speech and “voice” of the corpora-
tion as a real entity that deserves protection). 
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requires each human rights-holder to assert his or her own constitutional 
rights without recourse to a centralized enforcer [i.e., the corporation].”218 
This attention to intra-corporate conflicts as part of the Court’s legal analy-
sis is an important function of corporate theory in the Court’s thinking on 
corporate personhood. In that vein, the Supreme Court has assessed priva-
cy-based claims based on the interests of shareholders and has denied cor-
porate privacy rights if the disclosure of corporate information would ad-
vance the interests of the members of the corporate community, while 
exemptions from reporting would merely benefit a few corporate insid-
ers.219 Also, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate speech protec-
tion under the First Amendment has not been entirely blind to the corporate 
organizational structure even though the Court has held in Bellotti that the 
corporate identity of the speaker was not relevant. Thus, Justice Lewis F. 
Powell’s majority opinion in Bellotti addressed the question whether the in-
terests of “shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by man-
agement on behalf of the corporation” ought to be protected in the face of 
corporate political spending by management.220 
The Court had the opportunity to speak to the shareholder protection 
rationale in cases involving for-profit multi-shareholder corporations on 
several occasions in the 1970s, but it never decided the issue.221 For exam-
ple, in Bellotti (involving a bank’s use of general treasury funds to oppose a 
referendum proposal on raising state personal income tax) the majority 
opinion touched upon the issue of protection of shareholder rights as a 
compelling state interest to justify a statutory speech restriction.222 But in 
the end the Court left the issue unresolved.223 The decision holds that the 
statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive in protecting shareholder 
rights “under the circumstances of this case,”224 thus “leaving open the 
[question of the] constitutionality of an appropriately drawn shareholder 
protection statute.”225 
The Court reasoned as follows: “The statute is said to serve this inter-
est by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views 
with which some shareholders may disagree. This purpose is belied, how-
ever, by the provisions of the statute, which are both underinclusive and 
 
 218 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 788. 
 219 See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55, 81 (1974); Colonnade Catering 
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970). 
 220 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978). 
 221 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788; G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); California 
Bankers Ass’n, 416 U.S. at 55, 81; Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75. 
 222 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95. 
 223 In the context of the specific facts of this case, this might not be surprising considering that “giv-
en the subject matter of the referendum . . . , it was highly unlikely that intracorporate conflicts of inter-
est over the speech existed” on part of the shareholders.” Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
 224 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; see also id. at 793–94. 
 225 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
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overinclusive.”226 The Court decided the issue on the same grounds in Citi-
zens United,227 thus perpetuating its “decision-avoidance route”228 on the 
question.  
The Roberts Court further expressed in dicta, again in reference to Bel-
lotti, that “there is little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by 
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”229 In the 
eyes of the Court, “[t]hose reasons are sufficient to reject this shareholder 
protection interest.”230 
The enormous trust that the Court vests in such “procedures” while 
abdicating judicial oversight of fundamental shareholder interests in the 
performance of corporate actions that are blatantly political in character 
leaves much to be considered. The constitutionality of the shareholder pro-
tection rationale requires a more sophisticated examination than the cursory 
treatment that Citizens United and Bellotti offers on the issue. These are 
concerns that were raised first by Justice Byron White in his dissent in Bel-
lotti231 and then by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United.232 Jus-
tice Ginsburg in her dissent in Hobby Lobby adds another dimension to the 
protection rationale underpinning the corporate personhood debate, namely 
the impact on other constituencies, in other words, stakeholders, of the cor-
poration.233 The legal academy should ponder these considerations afresh. 
We take up the issue below.  
Several commentators have described the Supreme Court’s analysis as 
too “unsophisticated”234 since it shows the “tendency to anthropomorphize 
the corporation as a freestanding, sentient being”235 and lacks a thorough 
discussion of “the corporation, as a collective entity.”236 Greenwood em-
phasizes the crucial role of corporate theory in the corporate personhood 
debate by explaining that “[i]f corporate speech is to be corporate at all, 
there must be a clear explanation of how the group decision legitimately can 
be made.”237 
 (b) The Shortfalls of the “Corporate Democracy” Argument 
It is questionable whether regular procedures of “corporate democra-
 
 226 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793–94. 
 227 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010). 
 228 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
 229 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (internal citation omitted). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802–22 (White, J., dissenting). 
 232 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475–79 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 233 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2787(2014)).  
 234 Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1013; see also Ciepley, supra note 14, at 223.  
 235 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 772.  
 236 Greenwood, supra note 11, 1011. 
 237 Id. at 1024.  
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cy” sufficiently protect the rights of shareholders as the majority in Bellotti 
suggested238 and the majority in Citizens United confirmed (in dicta).239 In 
his dissent, Justice Stevens voiced concerns of “coerced speech” on part of 
shareholders “who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message” when 
management uses general treasury funds for electioneering expenditures.240 
Unlike the majority opinion (in dicta), Justice Stevens defies the notion that 
“abuse [of shareholder money] [can be] corrected by shareholders ‘through 
the procedures of corporate democracy.’”241 Justice Stevens introduces im-
portant aspects pertaining to corporate theory and the characteristics of the 
corporation into the discussion that the majority opinion merely scratched at 
the surface and left unresolved in the end.  
The majority Court in Citizens United followed the approach of the 
Bellotti Court with regard to the shareholder protection rationale. Based on 
Bellotti, procedures of “corporate democracy” as a vehicle for shareholder 
protection are to be understood to include “intracorporate remedies,” and 
“judicial remed[ies].”242 The Bellotti Court stated: 
Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist 
upon protective provisions in the corporation’s charter, shareholders 
normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests. In 
addition to intra-corporate remedies, minority shareholders generally 
have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge 
corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper 
corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of 
management.243 
Like Justice White more than 20 years earlier,244 Justice Stevens raises 
concerns to dismiss the shareholder protection rationale without further 
analysis.245 Justice Stevens warns about relying upon intra-corporate gov-
ernance systems and statutory actions since corporate law scholarship has 
found that “[i]n practice . . . many corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘these 
rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,’ given the internal authori-
ty wielded by boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded 
by the business judgment rule.”246 Especially, since general chartering has 
become the prevailing practice, shareholders’ leverage over management 
 
 238 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 239 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).  
 240 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 241 Id. at 476–77 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
 242 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794–95 (1978). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 804–06 (White, J., dissenting). 
 245 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 246 Id. at 477. 
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has decreased even more.247  
Also, the reasoning that dissenting shareholders are “free to withdraw 
[their] investment at any time and for any reason,”248 falls short of a sophis-
ticated in-depth analysis in light of corporate theory. Justice White, in his 
dissent in Bellotti, has undertaken a more thorough analysis of corporate 
theory to inform the discussion about the shareholder protection rationale. 
Thus, he accurately points out that usually corporations are “operated for 
the purpose of making profits.”249 Under modern-day corporate law, this 
common purpose unites the shareholders. Justice White emphasizes that 
“[t]his unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations 
make expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion 
or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no ma-
terial connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets.”250 
When this “unanimity in purpose breaks down,”251 as Justice White put it, 
the corporate law premise that shareholders share a common purpose, i.e., 
to increase the value of their investment, does not hold anymore and share-
holders morph again into the diverse groups of interests, beliefs, and values 
they are in reality, even if not under the corporate law fiction.252 This results 
in intra-corporate conflict when the corporation (through its management) 
engages in political speech.253  
Intra-corporate conflict can take different forms, however, depending 
on the right in question. Cases pertaining to corporate privacy claims vivid-
ly illustrate this point. In those cases, the asserted right to privacy against 
disclosure requirements of financial and other business information can 
conflict with “the interests of members of the corporation community,”254 
primarily shareholders, this would “shield . . . the enterprise from being 
used for unlawful purposes”255 or “prevent . . . organized crime from gain-
ing foothold in the industry”256 and thus protect shareholders’ investment. 
It is certainly true that shareholders invest in a company voluntarily 
and can withdraw their investment at any time by simply selling their stock. 
Unlike in partnerships, exit is easily possible in corporations due to the liq-
 
 247 See Morton Horwitz, supra note 50, at 181; see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic 
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1989).  
 248 Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978) (majority opinion). 
 249 Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting). 
 250 Id. at 805–06 (White, J., dissenting). 
 251 Id. 
 252 See Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1037. 
 253 Note that not all cases, where a corporation claims First Amendment rights, necessarily produce 
an intra-corporate conflict. Thus, as Burt Neuborne accurately observes, in “commercial speech, free 
press, and nonprofit corporation cases, . . . an intracorporate commonality of interest in asserting free 
speech protection undoubtedly exist[s].” Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
 254 Id. at 789 (citing California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)). 
 255 Id.  
 256 Id. (citing Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970)). 
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uidation protection and the feature of perpetual life that is inherent in the 
corporate form.257 Usually, if an organization does not reflect the goals of 
(some of) its shareholders, those dissenting shareholders may leave the or-
ganization. It is fair to assume that this “‘exit’ mechanism . . . will keep the 
leadership relatively representative.”258 Corporations, however, “may have 
more features of exit failures [for non-financial reasons] than many other 
organizations, due to the importance of the profit motive as the primary rea-
son investors participate.”259 Moreover, since the corporate form has be-
come the most important investment vehicle of modern times operating on a 
strict profit-maximizing premise,260 it is difficult to argue that shareholders 
should foreclose an economic opportunity (which is the very reason why 
they invested in the first place) if they disagree with the politics of the cor-
poration.261 The inherent risk is that “people who have invested in the busi-
ness corporation for purely economic reasons” might be taken advantage of 
if they are not willing to “sacrific[e] their economic objectives.”262  
Granted, a dissenting shareholder is not compelled to continue being a 
member of a corporation, but it compels him to choose his political beliefs 
over his economic goals. Pointing to the “exit solution” does not, however, 
solve the shareholder protection issue pertaining to the corporate person-
hood discussion. This is particularly true, since, as Justice Stevens high-
lighted, “[m]ost American households that own stock do so through inter-
mediaries such as mutual funds and pension plans, [citation omitted] which 
makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings.”263 
The absurdity of the exit solution as a viable vehicle for shareholder protec-
tion would be even more amplified in corporate privacy cases, since grant-
ing corporations and their management a right to confidentiality and even 
secrecy defies the transparency that is needed for shareholders to decide 
whether or not to exit. While Justices Stevens and White have introduced a 
perspective that is informed by corporate theory and accounts for some of 
the complexities of the corporate form, the Court has yet to speak on the 
constitutionality of the shareholder protection rationale. The issue needs a 
more thorough and sophisticated treatment by the Court than the brief dicta 
in Citizens United and the holding in Bellotti offer so far. Also, a more in-
depth corporate theory analysis of the doctrine of corporate personhood is 
necessary in the legal scholarship. This is particularly true since the Court 
 
 257 See, e.g., Ciepley, supra note 14, at 226; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER & 
MICHAEL J. ROBERTS, BUSINESS STRUCTURES 138–39 (2002)  
 258 Greenwood, supra note 11, at 1026. 
 259 Id. at 1032. 
 260 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 565. 
 261 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 477–78 (2010) (Stephens, J., dissent-
ing). 
 262 Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L. REV. 133, 201 (1998). 
 263 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 477 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
3KAEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/15  12:18 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:591 (2015) 
634 
in Hobby Lobby has again deferred disputes among owners to remedies un-
der state corporate law.264 The insufficient nature of such remedies appears 
particularly stark in closed corporations where deadlock situations to the 
detriment of minority owners are common due to the lack of a readily avail-
able market for shares in closed corporations.265 State courts have increas-
ingly extended fiduciary duties to be owed by majority shareholders to mi-
nority ones in closed corporations for that reason.266 The Supreme Court’s 
reliance on the constitutional structure of the corporation and rule by major-
ity under that structure in Hobby Lobby,267 is at odds with this sell-
established corporate law doctrine. 
While this article aims to illustrate this need for a corporate-theory in-
formed approach to corporate personhood and highlights the normative im-
plications that such an approach would have, it recognizes that much more 
isis to be said on the various corporate theory aspects pertaining to the doc-
trine of corporate personality, including on the shareholder protection ra-
tionale. However, this is beyond the scope of this article and remains open 
for future treatment in the scholarship.  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s analysis on the corporate 
theory prerogatives of corporate personhood falls short at times, corporate 
theory is still deeply engrained in the methodological DNA of the Court as 
the relevant case law over the last century has shown. The ECHR on the 
other hand, has ignored corporate theory altogether in its jurisprudence 
dealing with corporate “human rights” under the Convention. The norma-
tive implication of this approach is that intra-corporate conflicts are not ac-
counted for in the Court’s analysis on corporate personhood and the scope 
of corporate fundamental rights, such as speech, privacy, and due process. 
This is particularly problematic in a European context, where derivative ac-
tions for shareholders to address grievances are not clearly articulated in le-
gal practice.268  
 C. Europe’s Missing “Corporate” Person 
While the European Court of Human Rights, like the Supreme Court, 
has broadly extended the rights provisions under its jurisdiction to compa-
nies, with the exception of several rights that are considered applicable only 
to natural persons,269 there is one key difference that can be observed, 
namely the role of corporate theory or the lack thereof in the jurisprudence 
 
 264 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014). 
 265 See generally David G. Epstein et. al, BUSINESS STRUCTURES (2002). 
 266 Id.  
 267 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 2768. 
 268 See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. 
Econ. Perspectives 117, 133–34 (2007). 
 269 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 110. 
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of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). Even though the ECHR “settled on a surprisingly favourable 
view of the applicability of the rights and entitlements to corporate claim-
ants,”270 the analysis of the Court often falls short and is primarily grounded 
in a pragmatist view with strong teleological considerations, while the cor-
porate identity of the rights applicant is simply ignored. As in the United 
States, the right to speech (Article 10 of the Convention) and the right to 
privacy (Article 8 of the Convention) have been most heavily debated be-
fore the ECHR. It is in this context that the corporate identity of the appli-
cant creates the most traction with regard to the rights protection in ques-
tion. 
In the discussion below, this article examines the absence of corporate 
theory in European judicial views about corporate speech and privacy rights 
under the Convention. Nor is there hardly any recognition of the competing 
interests of shareholder and other stakeholder of the firm in how the Euro-
pean Courts determine the scope of corporate under the Convention. 
 1. The Lack of Corporate Theory  
It was not until 1980 that the ECHR first decided a case involving cor-
porate speech. In Sunday Times v. UK, the ECHR granted speech protec-
tions to a newspaper company “without any discussion as to the relevance 
of its corporate nature of the underlying for-profit motivations.”271 The 
ECHR was confronted with similar cases in the following years in Markt 
Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany and Groppera Radio AG, where the 
ECHR again held that corporate applicants fell under the scope of Article 
10 of the Convention.272 However, in neither of those cases was the corpo-
rate element explicitly discussed by the ECHR. It was only in its decision in 
Autronic AG v. Switzerland that the ECHR conducted a more thorough 
analysis of the status of corporate speech under the Convention.273 For that 
reason, Autronic can be considered the ECHR’s watershed decision on cor-
porate speech.274 
In a series of case law, the ECHR arrived at a line of jurisprudence that 
considered the profit-making motive as irrelevant.275 The status as a “profit-
making corporate bod[y]” was therefore not the controversial element in 
 
 270 Id. at 111.  
 271 Sunday Times v. UK, 38 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 59(b) (1981)  
 272 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25 
(1989); Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49 (1990). 
 273 Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 47(1), (2) (1990). 
 274 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 129. 
 275 See Casado Coca v. Spain, 285 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1994); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH 
and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 26 (1989); see also EMBERLAND, supra 
note 10, at 140. 
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Autronic.276 The ECHR kept its analysis brief and held that “neither Autron-
ic AG’s legal status as a limited company nor the fact that its activities were 
commercial nor the intrinsic nature of the freedom of expression can de-
prive Autronic AG of the protection of Art. 10.”277 However, the respondent 
government, Switzerland, argued that Article 10 of the Convention does not 
apply due to the purely transactional character of the speech that did not 
“attach . . . any importance to the content of the transmission . . . , since it 
was pursuing purely economic and technical interests.”278 Switzerland 
raised the concern that this would lead to the protection of mere business 
activity stating that “freedom of expression that was exercised . . . exclu-
sively for pecuniary gain came under the head of economic freedom.”279 In 
Autronic, the ECHR eventually granted protection of freedom of expression 
that merely sought to demonstrate the functioning of a satellite dish to pro-
mote sales; the content of the speech was entirely irrelevant and no interests 
of a target audience were protected.280 In comparison, the U.S. Supreme 
Court strictly applies the “free marketplace of ideas”281 concept to commer-
cial speech, with the consequence that both the speech and the content of 
the speech are highly relevant. In that regard, the ECHR grants broader pro-
tection of corporate speech than the Supreme Court, which can be widely 
regarded as the leading protagonist promoting the commercial speech doc-
trine.282  
The ECHR’s decision in Autronic is emblematic of an approach that 
focuses on the underlying values that the corporate claim might protect, 
such as speech as a function of democracy,283 rather than with an ontologi-
cal analysis of whether the respective right can (by their nature and histori-
cal conception under the Convention) be extended to corporations, despite 
no explicit textual interpretative support.284 Thus, the ECHR has based its 
decision in Autronic on the importance of protecting the content of speech 
and the substance of ideas as a function of the right of the listeners, who 
have “the right to receive and impart information,” even if the latter is 
 
 276 See Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 47(1) (1990). 
 277 Id.  
 278 Id. at ¶44.  
 279 Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990). 
 280 Id.  
 281 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 330 (2010); New York State Bd. of 
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008); Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 282 See Eric Barendt, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 54 (1985). 
 283 Handyside v. UK, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49(2) (1979); see also Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 46 (1999).  
 284 The ECHR has at times made a textual argument to support the application of the Convention to 
corporations, stating that, according to the text of the Convention, the provisions apply “to ‘everyone,’ 
whether natural or legal persons.” See, e.g., Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 
47(1) (1990). 
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commercial in nature.285 The ECHR’s approach is reminiscent of the Su-
preme Court’s alleged shift from “ontology to teleology” in its corporate 
constitutional rights jurisprudence, as discussed above.286 
The interpretative approach of the ECHR is informed by the notion 
that the Convention is “an Instrument designed to maintain and promote the 
ideals and values of democratic society.”287 This results in an “objective” 
approach to human rights protection that focuses on how the applicant’s 
claim is conducive to promoting general values underlying the Convention, 
such as equal treatment, rule of law and democracy, rather than on the sub-
jective rights position of the applicant.288 With this approach, the ECHR 
was able to avoid difficult questions of corporate theory and, even more 
importantly, questions pertaining to the role of corporations in society.  
In its case law, the ECHR acknowledges that corporations can be in-
volved in pure commercial speech (characterized by the intent to “incit[e] 
the public to purchase a particular product”)289 as well as political (in terms 
of non-commercial) speech.290 Political speech is present when the state-
ments “participate in a debate affecting the general interest”291 or concern 
“controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general.”292 It is ir-
relevant, according to the ECHR, if the statements are commercially moti-
vated.293 Thus, some forms of corporate speech benefit from the stringent 
protections awarded to political speech that significantly reduces the “mar-
gin of appreciation” afforded to national authorities of the member states.294 
Emberland has described this approach by the ECHR precisely, stating that 
“[p]olitical elements in the speech tend . . . to consume whatever commer-
 
 285 Id. at ¶ 47. 
 286 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study, 88 HAR. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975); see also 
EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 136, 146. 
 287 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 53(3) (1979). 
 288 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 139–46. 
 289 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶57 (2001).  
 290 Compare VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶57 (2001) (re-
garding commercial speech), Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, 16354/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) 
(commercial speech), and Sigma Radio Television Ltd. V. Cyprus, 32181/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) 
(commercial speech) with Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (regarding political speech), Sunday Times v. UK, 38 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 
59(b) (1981) (political speech), Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 
(1990) (political speech), TV Test AS v. Norway, 21132/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (political speech), and 
Standard Verlagsgesellschaft MBH v. Austria, 37464/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (political speech). 
 291 Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 1 (1999).  
 292 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H. R. 4 at ¶70 (2001). 
 293 See Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 47 (1998).  
 294 Id. (holding that “[a] margin of appreciation is particularly essential in commercial matters . . . 
[i]t is however necessary to reduce the extent margin of the appreciation when what is at stake is not a 
given individual’s purely ‘commercial’ statements, but his participation in a debate affecting the general 
interest, for example over public health”) 
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cial motivation may have prompted the statement at the outset.”295  
The extension by the ECHR to include corporate speech under the pro-
tections of the Convention has been opposed by national courts and gov-
ernments of member states, especially in cases of commercial speech with-
out a clear political nexus.296 In the face of such resistance and the 
increasing criticism of judicial activism,297 it seems surprising that the 
ECHR has not based its analysis on a general discussion of the nature of 
business organizations and the normative implications of bringing the latter 
under the ambit of the Convention.  
The ECHR has extended Article 10 protections, without any detailed 
analysis, in cases of corporate speech that contributes to a debate of public 
interest. In cases of speech that are purely commercial, however, the ECHR 
explicitly examines the corporate identity of the speaker and whether it fits 
under the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention.298 Yet, even in those cases, 
the ECHR does not draw upon corporate theory and the question of the na-
ture of the corporation or other forms of business organizations concerned, 
such as LLCs, partnerships, etc. As reflected in American scholarship on 
corporate personhood under the U.S. Constitution, corporate theory is 
deemed decisive, particularly in cases pertaining to corporate political 
speech and especially if the case concerns a for-profit (multi-shareholder) 
corporation.299 If a company/management engages in political speech, the 
diversity in shareholder values and beliefs becomes apparent and can lead 
to intra-corporate conflicts of interest that cannot be ignored in the corpo-
rate personhood debate.300 In contrast, cases concerning purely commercial 
speech, such as advertisements, show a commonality in interest that is 
prevalent among shareholders and other members of the corporate commu-
nity301 since there may be a “material connection with or effect upon their 
business.”302 Corporate theory would help identify, account for, and avoid 
intra-corporate conflict with competing interests of corporate constituents, 
i.e., primarily shareholders but possibly also other stakeholders.  
 
 295 EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 119.  
 296 Swiss government in Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990); 
German government in: Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) 161 ¶ 25 (1989) (holding that the speech in question is “not intended to influence or mobilise 
public opinion, but to promote the economic interests of a given group of undertakings” and therefore 
“fell within the scope of the freedom to conduct business . . . , which is not protected by the Conven-
tion.”); See also Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 
BVerfGE 102, 347 (2000), 102 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 591, 2001 (Ger.). 
 297 See Jean-Paul Costa, On the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments, 7 
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 173, 174 (2011). 
 298 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 119, 129. 
 299 See Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
 300 See Daniel Greenwood, supra note 13, at 1093.  
 301 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 792. 
 302 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, the question arises why the ECHR has not considered corporate 
theory to inform its analysis about the applicability of the Convention to 
corporations. First, unlike in the United States, political speech cases in the 
commercial area are usually not concerned primarily with the legitimacy of 
corporate electioneering, since campaign financing by corporations plays 
only a limited role under the law and practice in Europe. Rather, the land-
mark cases before the ECHR on the issue of political speech in a commer-
cial context have dealt with cases involving speech by business organiza-
tions or professionals in a commercial context (often with a competition-
related significance) that contributes to a general public debate.303 This form 
of corporate speech is less directly related to the political processes, which 
might explain why the ECHR has not felt the need to discuss the problems 
pertaining to the commercial nature of the speech to the same extent that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has done. This does not mean, however, that corporate 
theory would not be relevant in the analysis of the ECHR, as has been ar-
gued before. It simply might provide an explanation why the ECHR has not 
focused much of its intellectual effort on questions pertaining to the corpo-
rate nature of the rights applicant. 
Second, the ECHR has not had to decide yet a political speech case in-
volving a publicly held business corporation with multiple shareholders. 
Markt intern involved a publishing firm that “seeks to defend the interests 
of small and medium-sized retail businesses against the competition of 
large-scale distribution companies.”304 Like in the United States, the media 
sector enjoys special protection under the European regime considering its 
critical function as a “public watchdog” in a democratic society.305 The oth-
er case before the ECHR that involved commercial speech contributing to a 
general public debate is Hertel. This case did not concern statements by a 
general for-profit corporation either. Rather, the case dealt with statements 
made by an individual researcher in the economic sphere and with a likely 
effect on fair competition.306 
It is, however, to be expected that the ECHR will be confronted with 
cases of corporate speech involving a for-profit multi-shareholder corpora-
tion, especially in a competition-related context, in the near future. This is 
particularly true ever since the Lisbon Treaty integrated the European hu-
man rights regime even deeper into the EU legal system.307 Now that the 
European Convention on Human Rights is binding on EU institutions, com-
 
 303 See Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25 
(1989); see also Groppera Radio and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1990). 
 304 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 9 
(1989). 
 305 Observer and Guardian v. UK, 216 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at ¶ 59 (b) (1992).  
 306 Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 32 (1999).  
 307 See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty 
of Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 654 (2011). 
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panies can rely directly on the protections under the Convention as a de-
fense against antitrust investigations by the European Commission as the 
main enforcer of EU antitrust laws.  
Major publicly traded companies invoked rights under the Convention 
in an EU antitrust context even before the Lisbon Treaty, and it is likely that 
we will see more rather than less cases like this in the future. Thus, the 
software giant Intel has raised due process concerns (based on Article 6(1) 
of the Convention) in EU antitrust proceedings challenging the broad inves-
tigatory powers of the EU Commission.308  
Against this backdrop, the precedent of Hertel could easily translate 
into a case involving a large business corporation making statements on 
general issues of public debate as part of their marketing strategy with a 
possible effect on competition. A case before the German Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) involving Benetton, the major Italian 
fashion company, dealt with exactly that situation, namely a sharp focus on 
corporate political speech. The case concerned Benetton’s controversial 
“shock” advertising campaign. The German Constitutional Court found the 
unfair competition ban on the advertisement to be unconstitutional since it 
was violating the company’s freedom of expression. The Constitutional 
Court held that the use of “strong imagery to create associations with con-
troversial issues for the purpose of marketing the firm’s goods, even if the 
imagery/issue lacked a connection to the firm’s goods or services.”309 Under 
this judgment, corporations could use marketing tools to engage in public 
debates and raise awareness of general issues. 
 2. The Missing Protection Rationale 
Aside from the ECHR’s corporate speech jurisprudence, the lack of 
corporate theory in the Court’s corporate personhood debate becomes 
abundantly clear in its case law dealing with the prerogatives of corporate 
privacy protection under Article 8 of the Convention. 
The ECHR’s decision in Colas Est SA v. France310 constitutes a land-
mark case in the ECHR’s jurisprudence pertaining to Article 8 protections 
in a corporate context. Unlike in its previous case law, the ECHR made the 
leap in Colas to endorse the concept of corporate personality, independent 
of any nexus of the business activity to a natural person.311 Based on the 
facts of the case, Colas Est SA, a French (for-profit) corporation, was sub-
 
 308 See, Editorial, Intel’s Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/opinion/17mon2.html. 
 309 Peer Zumbansen, Federal Constitutional Court Rejects Ban on Benetton Shock Ads: Free Ex-
pression, Fair Competition and the Opaque Boundaries Between Political Message and Social Moral 
Standards, GERMAN L. J. (citing BVerfGE 102, 347 (2000)). 
 310 Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2002). 
 311 See id. at ¶ 40; see also EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 144.  
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ject to unwarranted searches and seizures on their corporate premises. The 
raids were conducted by the French competition authorities with the goal to 
secure evidence of anti-competitive practices.312 The ECHR had to decide 
whether corporate premises fall under the ambit of the “home” protection of 
Article 8 of the Convention.313 Yet again, the ECHR’s analysis falls short of 
a sophisticated examination of the corporate identity of the rights applicant 
and the normative implications for the human members of the corporation, 
primarily its shareholders.314  
Referring to the principle of dynamic interpretation, the ECHR simply 
held that “the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions . . . . Building on its dynamic interpre-
tation of the Convention, the Court considers that the time has come to hold 
that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Con-
vention may be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s 
registered office, branches or other business premises.”315 While the ECHR 
relied on its previous precedents granting a corporate “home” protection 
under Article 8 of the Convention,316 the respondent government as well as 
commentators have emphasized the important differences on the facts that 
set the case of Colas apart, thus making the ECHR’s analogous approach 
seem an imperfect fit.317 The respondent government, here France, empha-
sized that that “although the Court had made clear [in its previous case law] 
that professional or business addresses were protected by Article 8, all the 
cases in which it had made that finding had concerned premises where a 
natural person had carried on an occupation.”318 The case of Colas, howev-
er, lacked this individual nexus as the case concerned the “business premis-
es of public limited companies.”319 One could argue that the Colas court 
over-inflated the holding from its previous case law on the topic. 
Also, the other precedent that the ECHR relies upon, namely Chappell 
v. UK,320 seems to be comparable to the situation presented in Colas, but in 
fact differs in one crucial respect. Like in the Colas case, Chappell involved 
searches and seizures on company premises. In the latter case, however, the 
company offices also served as the home of its only shareholder.321 This 
made the corporate premises closely intertwined with the personal sphere of 
 
 312 Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 9–11 (2002). 
 313 Id. at ¶ 28. 
 314 See id. at 41 (focusing on the “dynamic interpretation of the Convention” as a “living instrument” 
rather than the underyling question pertaining to the nature of the corporations and related theories of the 
firm). 
 315 Id. 
 316 See id. at ¶ 40. 
 317 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 14. 
 318 Id. at ¶ 30. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Chappell v. UK, 152 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1989). 
 321 Id. at ¶ 26(b). 
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the owner of the corporation, Mr. Chappell. Thus, before Colas, all corpo-
rate Article 8 cases involved an “individual link” such that the corporate 
premises in question were located in the private “home” (and thus fall in the 
personal sphere) of a professional322 or the only shareholder.323  
It is fair to say that the ECHR took its holding in Niemietz324 and 
Chappell one step further with its decision in Colas. Like in all its previous 
jurisprudence dealing with corporate personhood issues, the ECHR did not 
discuss the nature of the corporation and the implications for protection un-
der the Convention.325 But for the first time the ECHR endorsed, if only im-
plicitly in Colas, the notion of the corporation as a real entity that is not re-
ducible to its members. Emberland accurately describes this judicial 
development as follows: “The Niemietz Court was concerned with the risk 
of arbitrary under-inclusion of interests that pertain to the individual person. 
This approach is not necessarily transportable to the corporate context 
where an individual nexus is at best remotely present.”326 
These examples vividly illustrate that corporate theory is severely un-
der-accounted for in the jurisprudence of the ECHR, while it is indispensa-
ble for answering questions of corporate personhood under the Convention. 
Especially, since the European Commission of Human Rights327 found in 
Church of Scientology of Paris v. France that “Article 8 of the Convention 
has more an individual than a collective character,”328 the ECHR should 
recognize corporate personality as a “pragmatic metaphor for a complex set 
of . . . human . . . relationships” and thus ensure that its judicial decisions on 
corporate personhood “reflect a proper calibration of those human activities 
and relationship, both within the corporation[s] and between participants in 
the corporate enterprise and the outside world.”329 This approach would be 
entirely consistent with the ECHR’s interpretative methodology that is 
premised on pragmatic effectiveness according to which the “[c]onvention 
is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights 
 
 322 Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97 ¶ 27 (1993). 
 323 Chappell v. UK, 152 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1989). 
 324 Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 325 See Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 40–42 (2002). 
 326 EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 140.  
 327 Until 1998, the European Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) assisted the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR); the Commission’s role was to decide on the admissibility of petitions 
to the ECHR. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ETS No. 155, entry into force November 1, 1998) eliminated the Commission ceased to exist 
and subsumed its functions into the larger and permanent ECHR. 
 328 Church of Scientology of Paris v. France, App. No. 19509/92, (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 9, 
1995) (HUDOC: European Court of Human Rights, Case-Law, Decisions), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (Until 1998, individual complaints under the European Convention on Human 
Rights had to be filed with the European Commission of Human Rights, which then decided on its ad-
missibility before bringing the case before the ECHR.). 
 329 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774. 
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that are practical and effective.”330 It would require an explicit discussion 
by the ECHR on the question about the nature of the corporation, involving 
the complex intra-corporate relationships tracing back to the separation of 
ownership and control in the corporate form. This would have important 
normative implications as intra-corporate conflict would be addressed.  
 IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
 A. Doctrinal Shift in Europe 
Important doctrinal lessons on the role of corporate theory in the Eu-
ropean debate on corporate personhood can be learned from American ju-
risprudence and scholarship.331 It becomes patent that while in Europe the 
“corporate” in corporate personhood is ignored, in the United States it is 
sidestepped in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. Still, the American ap-
proach is much more nuanced than the European one and thus provides an 
important benchmark to inform the corporate personhood jurisprudence by 
the European Courts.  
European corporate personhood doctrine requires a significant doctri-
nal shift that would make corporate theory about the nature of the corpora-
tion and the theories of the firm part of the legal debate. Corporate theory 
would help balance clashing interests of a company’s shareholders and mit-
igate intra-corporate conflicts as a result of corporate personhood.  
U.S. doctrine on the other hand, merely would require some more con-
sistency and a sharper re-focus on the corporate theory underpinnings of the 
corporate personhood doctrine. In particular, the implications for the United 
States are: (1) to realize that corporate theory has not been abandoned in 
general from the legal analysis by the Courts; (2) to recognize normatively 
that corporate theory needs to be explicitly revitalized as an integral part of 
corporate personhood doctrine. Specifically, a more robust analysis of ques-
tions pertaining to shareholder and constituency protection in large business 
corporations by the courts’ majority (not merely in dissent, concurrences, or 
dicta) is required to further mitigate intra-corporate conflicts effectively. A 
look to Europe illustrates the unfavorable consequences when this is ig-
nored. 
Part 1 below examines how U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence can 
help guide European Courts in unraveling intra-corporate relationships and 
then highlights some relevant European cases that merit a comparative 
analysis. The interests of shareholders and other stakeholders in the corpo-
ration are of primary concern here, as are shortcomings in the European ap-
 
 330 Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H..R. (ser. A) at ¶ 24(2) (1980); see also Comingersoll SA v. Portu-
gal, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 772 at ¶¶ 32(2)), 28(2) (2001).  
 331 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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proach to corporate personhood. In Part 2, the tendency by the European 
Courts to reduce the regulatory power of the member states over corpora-
tions is contrasted with the regulatory frameworks erected under American 
law and confirmed by the Supreme Court. Understanding the true content of 
corporate personhood may explain such variance. 
 1. Shareholder and Constituency Protection  
On several occasions, the ECHR has dealt with rights cases under the 
Convention involving publicly held corporations which are particularly 
prone to intra-corporate conflicts due to the diversity of interests of its 
broad shareholder base that can be in tension with the interests of manage-
ment. Corporate theory can be considered highly relevant in corporate 
rights cases involving multi-shareholder corporations as it can help uncover 
and thus avoid intra-corporate conflicts produced by the Court’s corporate 
personhood jurisprudence.332 Corporate theory would therefore provide im-
portant guidance to the Court’s corporate speech analysis in cases similar to 
Autronic that was dealing with a German AG (“Aktiengesellschaft,” i.e., 
publicly held corporation under German law) and its speech protections. It 
is to be noted that in the specific case of Autronic the Court was concerned 
with strict transactional commercial speech rather than with a corporation’s 
participation in a general public discourse or political speech. This makes 
intra-corporate conflicts between shareholders and management less likely 
since the nature of the speech is merely transactional in terms of promoting 
the company’s products and services.333 However, it is just a matter of time 
until the European Courts will find before them a case involving corporate 
speech claims by a multi-shareholder corporation to protect the content of 
its speech (through its management) and thus its right to contribute to a 
general public debate issues important to the corporation’s customer base, 
its management, or its controlling shareholders. 
A look to the U.S. Supreme Court can guide the European way. The 
Supreme Court has yet again been wrestling with the question of the nature 
of the corporation, the relationship between managerial decision-making 
and the (non-commercial) interests of its shareholders and other stakehold-
ers (here employees) and the normative implications for the understanding 
and scope of corporate constitutional rights in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores.334 By taking on the case, the Court signaled that the issue of diversi-
 
 332 See, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131; Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 
178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). 
 333 Especially in the specific case at hand, intra-corporate conflicts are not indicated since the speech 
that was sought to be protected here concerned merely the transmission of a satellite program for the 
purpose of demonstrating the functioning of hardware not however the content of the speech. 
 334 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
678 (2013). 
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ty of (non-commercial) shareholder and stakeholder interests and resulting 
intra-corporate conflicts in its corporate personhood jurisprudence is far 
from resolved, contrary to the common belief post-Citizens United.335 It is 
important to recognize that by holding that “the purpose of th[e] [corporate] 
fiction is to provide protection for human beings,”336 the Court dealt with a 
situation of reverse piercing of the corporate veil,337 while in its previous 
case law the Court assessed shareholder interests as compelling interests 
that might limit the regulatory reach of the government. Yet, the common 
thread of possible intra-corporate conflicts remains the same in all relevant 
cases—in Hobby Lobby with competing employee interests while in Bellotti 
and Citizens United with competing shareholder interests.  
Unlike their American counterpart, the European courts are not even 
engaging in the debate on how our understanding of the nature of the corpo-
ration (with an eye to its respective constituents) informs questions about 
corporate rights under the Convention as a function of the doctrine of cor-
porate personhood. It is imperative that the ECHR and the ECJ realize that 
corporate theory is not merely a theoretical wrinkle to the corporate person-
hood analysis, but it has far-reaching functional implications for the role of 
corporations as participants in modern society, as the case of Hobby Lobby 
vividly illustrates where “a for-profit corporation [denies] its employees the 
health coverage of contraceptives . . . , based on the religious objections of 
the corporation’s owners.”338 
The case of Colas out of the ECHR further illustrates vividly how cor-
porate theory would contribute to a much more nuanced corporate person-
hood doctrine in the European Courts. Deciding whether unwarranted 
searches and seizures on their corporate premises were permissible or 
whether they would constitute a violation of the protections under Article 8 
of the Convention, the ECHR lacked any discussion of the interest of Colas 
Est SA’s (“Société Anonyme,” equivalent to a public limited company un-
der common law) shareholders.339 By ignoring corporate theory the Court 
runs the risk of reaching results that might be counter to the interests of the 
corporate applicant’s constituents, primarily its shareholders but also its 
other stakeholders. It is imperative for European Courts to include a discus-
sion of the nature of the corporation (and underlying legal theories of the 
firm) in their analysis as corporate theory would help identify and mitigate 
intra-corporate conflicts. Thus, in the case of Colas, the interest of the cor-
poration to protect its internal information from disclosure can be consid-
 
 335 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010). 
 336 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).  
 337 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 
33, 34 (1990). 
 338 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13-
354). 
 339 Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 40–42. 
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ered in conflict with the competing interests of its shareholders in transpar-
ency in order to shield the (corporate) entity from liabilities arising from 
unlawful and/or anti-competitive behavior. As mentioned earlier, these 
competing rights might not necessarily constitute a “compelling interest” 
(to use the terminology of the U.S. Supreme Court) that would justify statu-
tory restrictions on corporate privacy. Or in terms of the ECHR’s terminol-
ogy, the restrictive measure might still be proportionate provided that effec-
tive remedies would be available to shareholders on a statutory basis or 
within the corporate governance structure.340 It is up to the ECHR to exam-
ine whether it considers those secondary remedies in the respective member 
state sufficient to dismiss a shareholder protection rationale. 
As Neuborne has hinted with regard to the American debate, this mod-
el also could be extended to account for conflicts with corporate constituen-
cies other than shareholders341 depending on the corporate objective and 
governance model prescribed under the respective legal system. While, like 
in the United States, the shareholder-centric model is still prevalent in Eu-
rope, there are a number of European civil law systems that feature a corpo-
rate governance model that is sensitive to stakeholder interests, such as 
Germany, France, and most recently the UK.342 
However, the ECHR has not only ignored important questions pertain-
ing to the characteristics and underlying relationship of the corporate form, 
but it has under-accounted for the question about the nature of the corpora-
tion in general.343 Considering that privacy is conceived as a human dignity 
right according to European legal culture,344 it seems surprising that the 
ECHR has not felt the need to discuss the nature of the corporation, particu-
larly in this context. The ECHR in fact passed up the opportunity to com-
ment on the applicants’ contention in Colas that the corporate premises 
should derive protection under the Convention from the rights of its em-
ployees, since the business documents seized also included private infor-
 
 340 See PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW 168–69 (2011).  
 341 Neuborne, supra note 15, at 774 (“[The legal doctrine of] corporate personality should reflect a 
proper calibration of those human activities and relationships, both within the corporation and between 
participants in the corporate enterprise and the outside world.”) (emphasis added.)). 
 342 See Kerr et al., supra note 18, at 113. For example, Germany and France provide for a two-tier 
board structure representing stakeholder interests in a supervisory function over management. The UK 
has amended its Company Code in 2006 to the effect of an extended corporate objective under the law 
that requires directors to act so as to “promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole,” including “the interests of the company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, and the impact of the company’s operations 
on the community and the environment.”  
 343 See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 9–11; see also Autronic AG v. 
Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). For a good overview of the different theories of the cor-
poration, see Millon, supra note 53. 
 344 See Whitman, supra note 191, at 1161. 
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mation of such staff.345 It appears that the ECHR is avoiding the hard ques-
tions regarding the nature of the corporate rights applicants despite the re-
ality that an explicit discussion of the issue would be logical as the ECHR 
faces mounting criticism of judicial activism. 
 2. The Regulatory State within Corporate Personhood 
The lack of corporate theory in the ECHR’s jurisprudence also mani-
fests itself in the failure to assess fundamental rights guarantees for corpora-
tions as a structural limitation on the government.346 Much of the jurispru-
dence and language of the Supreme Court has focused on this exact 
dimension of corporate guarantees347 under the Constitution since it gives 
important guidance on the regulatory implications of corporate rights deci-
sions. 
Unlike the ECHR, the Supreme Court has not yet decided about non-
election related political speech of for-profit corporations. The Supreme 
Court was confronted with this question in Nike v. Kasky, but the Court 
eventually dismissed the previously granted writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted without deciding on the merits.348 Some scholars and com-
mentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s sudden dismissal of the 
case might have been due to concerns that “recognizing a broad right of 
corporations to speak about matters of public concern might have [the] un-
fortunate effect” of undermining federal securities laws especially when the 
speech is exercised in the form of communications to prospective investors 
and proxy solicitations.349 
The ECHR, however, has held in more than one instance that in such 
cases the “margin of appreciation” (i.e., discretion) of national authorities350 
was reduced regardless of the potential implications on unfair competition 
laws in cases of commercial speech that include a non-commercial element 
in terms of contributing to a public debate.351 Thus, the ECHR expands fun-
 
 345 See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 ¶ 38. 
 346 See Millon, supra note 53, at 201. 
 347 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 
43, 74–76 (1906). 
 348 Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).  
 349 Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 863, 871 (2007); see also SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION, ch. 5 (2004) (commenting on the apprehension of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to 
mixed commercial speech entailing elements of political content).  
 350 When assessing the necessity of government interference, the state enjoys a certain ‘margin of 
appreciation,’ which is usually greater with regard to commercial matters. Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. 
Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 33 (1989). 
 351 See Hertel v. Switzerland 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at ¶ 47 (1998) (holding that”[t]he Swiss au-
thorities . . . had some margin of appreciation to decide whether there was a . . . need to impose the in-
junction in question . . . [;] [s]uch a margin of appreciation is particularly essential in commercial mat-
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damental rights protections of corporations in a way that is less sensitive to 
the existing regulatory regimes than seems to be the case in the United 
States. An informed discussion about the nature of the corporation, as a fic-
tional person, and its relationship to the state would shed light on important 
implications of the line of jurisprudence of the ECHR with regard to corpo-
rate fundamental guarantees. 
 B. Institutional Payout 
Aside from this normative payout in the form of doctrinal shifts, put-
ting corporate theory back into the corporate personhood analysis has im-
portant institutional payouts for Europe that would help resolve the emerg-
ing divergence between the ECJ and ECHR on the issue. While pre-Lisbon 
case law of the ECJ signals a strong deference to regulatory authority of EU 
institutions over corporations (thus diminishing the rights of corporations 
within the EU legal regime),352 the ECHR has granted broad protections to 
corporations.353  
There is clearly a demand in Europe for resolving this issue in the two 
European courts, demand coming from national legal systems themselves. 
A transatlantic answer to this dilemma can be found in U.S. jurisprudence. 
This approach would bring the ECHR in line with the national legal sys-
tems of the member states that have urged the ECHR on several occasions 
to deal with the corporate nature of applicants and not simply equate corpo-
rations with persons under the Convention without any further analysis.354 
A corporate theory-informed methodology would significantly improve the 
interaction of the European courts with national legal systems and further 
advance the Convention law as an approximation of national laws of mem-
ber states.355 
The discussion in Part 1 below briefly touches on European collectiv-
ism and the protection of group rights in national law as well as the con-
trasting American tradition of individualism. Part 2 examines the evolving 
 
ters, especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition . . . It is however nec-
essary to reduce the extent of the margin of appreciation when what is at stake is not a given individual’s 
purely ‘commercial’ statements, but his participation in a debate affecting the general interest, for exam-
ple, over public health.”); see also VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H R. 4 ¶ 
69–71 (2001) (“[I]n the present case the extent of the margin of appreciation is reduced, since what is at 
stake is not a given individual’s purely ‘commercial’ interests, but his participation in a debate affecting 
the general interest.”). 
 352 See Case 136/79, Nat’l Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. 2033; see also Joined Cas-
es 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 2859.  
 353 See EMBERLAND, supra note 10, at 234–35 (elaborating on the “pioneering role” of the ECHR 
with regard to corporate rights under the Convention). 
 354 See Germany, France, Switzerland. 
 355 See generally Jaanika Erne, Discourse upon the Constituent Human Rights Development in the 
European Union, 12 JURIDICA 80 (2007). 
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convergence of the European Union’s regulatory system and the ECHR’s 
human rights regime and how their differing methodologies can lead to se-
rious incoherencies in the European legal system. A coherent understanding 
of corporate personhood would help overcome those contradictions. 
 1. Reconciling the ECHR and Member State Courts Regarding 
Group Rights 
While this article does not attempt to conduct a comprehensive inves-
tigation into the plausible reasons for the lack of corporate theory in Euro-
pean jurisprudence dealing with corporate personhood, the following sec-
tion introduces one consideration—European collectivism—that seems to 
shed some light on the current legal reality in Europe. 
European culture has been influenced significantly by collectivism, 
what has translated into a strong protection of group rights. Germany’s 
Basic Law [i.e., the German Constitution] provides for an explicit protec-
tion of group rights in Article 19 III.356 It might therefore be surprising why 
European member states, which were respondents in corporate rights cases 
before the ECHR, were resistant to include corporations as legal persons 
under the ambit of the Convention.357 Looking at the comments of the re-
spondent governments in the Markt Intern, the Colas, Niemietz, and Autron-
ic cases, it becomes apparent that the issue is not the nature of the corpora-
tion as an association or group, but rather the commercial nature of the 
activity and the purely economic interests that would bar an application of 
Convention rights.358 It might be exactly this legal culture in the member 
states and the experienced resistance by respondent states so far that has 
motivated the ECHR to avoid an explicit discussion of the corporate identi-
ty of the rights applicant and related issues pertaining to corporate theory. 
Yet, it does not resolve the issue and further puts in jeopardy the collabora-
tion between the ECHR and member state courts. 
American ideology, on the other hand, is deeply grounded in individu-
alism,359 of which corporate activity can be considered a function. The al-
leged pro-business jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court appears like a 
product of the tenets underlying American society. While certainly not 
claiming to provide a comprehensive reasoning, this difference in ideology 
in the United States and Europe can provide some insights into the possible 
 
 356 Note that the U.S. Constitution lacks a similar provision. 
 357 See, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 ¶ 30; Autronic AG v. Switzer-
land, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44(2) (1990); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 25(1) (1989). 
 358 See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 at ¶ 30; Niemetz v. Germany, 16 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 97 ¶ 30(2) (1993); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 44 
(1990); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 161 ¶ 25(1) (1989). 
 359 SEYMOUR LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 33 (1996). 
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reasons for the discrepancy between the corporate personhood jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court and the ECHR. 
 2. Mitigating Post-Lisbon Tensions in Overlapping Jurisdiction 
between the ECHR and ECJ 
The regulatory perspective on corporate personhood is particularly im-
portant post-Lisbon due to the convergence between the EU’s regulatory 
system and the European human rights regime. The Lisbon Treaty requires 
the EU to accede to the Convention, which will have the consequence that 
EU institutions are also (directly) bound by the human rights protections 
under the Convention.360 
The Council of Europe has stated the reasons for the changes in the 
EU legal structure as follows: 
The EU has developed a separate legal order, with the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in Luxembourg as its highest court. Whereas all EU 
member states are also parties to the ECHR, the EU itself is currently not. 
Even though the EU is founded on the respect for fundamental rights, the 
observance of which is ensured by the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion, the ECHR and its judicial mechanism do not formally apply to EU acts. 
On the other hand, all member states of the EU, as parties to the Conven-
tion, have an obligation to respect the ECHR even when they are applying 
or implementing EU law. This divergence may be rectified by the EU, as 
such, becoming a party to the Convention.361 
The EU’s antitrust proceedings have long been criticized by commen-
tators as lacking the necessary procedural safeguards that would be indicat-
ed in light of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. Under the exist-
ing Commission rules, for example, “dawn raids” on corporate offices are 
often conducted by the EU Commission.362 This practice by the EU Com-
mission has been upheld by the ECJ as being in conformity with the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. The ECJ held that the surprise raids as 
part of EU competition law enforcement do not violate the ‘home’ protec-
tion under Article 8 of the Convention.363 This holding flies in the face of 
the ECHR’s long jurisprudence broadly construing the “home” protection 
 
 360 See PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW 362–63 (2011).  
 361 European Convention on Human Rights: Accession of the EU, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last visited March 15, 
2014). 
 362 See Anne MacGregor & Bogdan Gecic, Due Process in EU Competition Cases Following the 
Introduction of the New Best Practices Guidelines on Antitrust Proceedings, 3 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. 
& PRAC. 425, 425 (2012); see also Alan Riley, Do Companies Have Human Rights: EU antitrust law 
may violate due process rules, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052970203609204574314333538014034. 
 363 See Case 136/79, Nat’l Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. 2033. 
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under Article 8 of the Convention to include unwarranted searches and sei-
zures on corporate premises.364 
The ECJ also has confirmed other practices that are part of the Com-
mission’s broad investigatory powers as constitutional. Thus, it held that the 
EU could request documents without specifically identifying them and im-
pose penalties on a company for refusing to submit to the investigation.365 It 
remains to be seen how these broad investigatory powers of the Commis-
sion will be judged by the ECHR, which has concurrent jurisdiction on the 
matter post-Lisbon. 
However, in an attempt to counter-balance the extensive investigatory 
powers of the Commission, the ECJ granted corporations some other rights 
that go beyond the scope of protections awarded under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. While the ECJ was not able to find a right 
against self-incrimination in the law of the Member States or under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, the Court still held that it “[i]t is nec-
essary, however, to consider whether certain limitations on the Commis-
sion’s powers of investigation are implied by the need to safeguard the 
rights of the defence which the Court has held to be a fundamental principle 
of the Community legal order.”366 What these limitations entail, and what 
body of law they are grounded in, remains to be clarified by the ECJ.  
The methodology that the ECJ applies to questions pertaining to cor-
porate fundamental rights protections is primarily guided by the regulatory 
state of the EU bureaucracy. In contrast, the approach by the ECHR regard-
ing corporate rights extensions under the Convention is informed by prag-
matic teleology of the underlying Convention values. This difference in 
methodology has the potential to create serious incoherencies in the Euro-
pean legal system, especially since the ECJ and ECHR will have overlap-
ping jurisdiction on the matter. A systemic and coherent approach to the 
questions pertaining to corporate personhood is required that cannot be 
conducted in the abstract, but rather needs to be informed by corporate the-
ory for the reasons laid out in this article. In practice, this clash between in-
vestigatory discretion of the EU Commission, as confirmed by the ECJ, and 
corporate “human” rights protection as promoted by the ECHR will likely 
become more pronounced and might create legal insecurity with regard to 
corporate rights guarantees in Europe. Finally, it remains to be seen if the 
“freedom to conduct business,”367 which is codified in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the EU (that is binding primary EU law since Lisbon), 
 
 364 See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 131; Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 97 (1993). 
 365 Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 2859. 
 366 Case 74/87, Orkem SA v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 3283 ¶ 32. 
 367 European Union (EU): Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, December 7, 
2000, 40 I.L.M. 266, 268 (2001) (“Freedom to conduct a business: The freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised.”). 
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might further exacerbate the divergence between the highest EU Court in 
Strasbourg and Europe’s human rights court in Luxembourg. 
CONCLUSION 
The changes in Europe’s fundamental and human rights system in tan-
dem with the alleged overreach of EU institutions, most prominently in an 
antitrust context, have put the doctrine of corporate personhood at the fore-
front of the legal debate. Making corporate theory an important factor in the 
analysis ensures that the diversity of shareholder interests is acknowledged 
and effectively protected. After all, investor protection has become a key 
objective of European governments and the European Union alike.368 Draw-
ing upon corporate theory to address open questions of corporate person-
hood and related issues of corporate fundamental and human rights will fur-
ther promote this objective. Aside from such a normative payout in the form 
of corporate legal doctrine, this approach also would bring the ECHR in 
line with the national legal systems of the member states that have urged the 
ECHR on several occasions to deal with the corporate nature of applicants 
and not simply equate corporations with persons under the Convention. A 
corporate theory-informed methodology would significantly improve the 
interaction of the European Courts with national legal systems and further 
advance the Convention law as an approximation of national laws of mem-
ber states.369  
While the American approach to corporate personhood has proven to 
be much more nuanced with regard to accounting for the corporate nature of 
the rights claimant, a more robust analysis of questions pertaining to share-
holder protection in large business corporations by the courts’ majority (not 
merely in dissent or dicta) is required to mitigate intra-corporate conflicts 
effectively. After all, as Justice Stevens has put it, “[c]orporations help 
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their 
‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not them-
selves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitu-
tion was established.”370 But their shareholders and stakeholders are the 
“People,” as the Supreme Court has reinforced in Hobby Lobby where the 
majority emphasized that “it is important to keep in mind that the purpose 
of th[e] [corporate] fiction is to provide protection . . . for the people (in-
cluding shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with the 
corporation.”371 The premise that shareholders have common interests, 
 
 368 See Financial Services: Commission Acts to Improve Investor Protection and Efficiency in the 
EU Investment Fund Market, EUR. COMM’N, IP/10/869 (July 1, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-10-869_en.htm). 
 369 See Sweet & Keller, supra note 87. 
 370 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 371 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
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might well hold in the realm of business activity of the firm, but one is hard 
pressed to find the same alignment in interest with regard to non-
commercial activity, such as political speech or corporate secrecy. In fact, 
the interests of shareholders are highly diversified and divergent in the 
modern corporation.372 
It is time to account for this reality in the corporate personhood debate 
rather than conducting the debate in a fictional vacuum. We need to put the 
“corporate” back into corporate personhood by addressing the possible in-
tra-corporate tensions as a function of modern corporate governance struc-
tures. Recourse to corporate theory can help untangle the oxymoron that has 
emerged from much of the existing debate on corporate personhood, name-
ly the fiction that corporations are people and thus bearers of the same 
rights as individuals. If the European Courts endorse the concept of corpo-
rate human rights, this discussion needs to be tied more closely to the inter-
ests of a corporation’s human constituents, namely, its shareholders and—
depending on the prevailing corporate theory in a national context—its oth-
er stakeholders. 
 
 372 See Anabtawi, supra note 154, at 577–93 (showing the divergent interests of shareholders in 
terms of long-term versus short-term holdings, diversified versus undiversified portfolios, insider versus 
outsider equity ownership, and hedged versus unhedged holders). 
